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What is the proper legal standard for product integration involving
software? Because software is subject to low marginal costs, network effects,
and rapid technological innovation, the Supreme Court's existing antitrust
rules on tying arrangements, which evolved from industries not possessing
such characteristics, are inappropriate. In this Article, I ask why firms
integrate software products. Next, I review the Supreme Court's tying
decisions in Jefferson Parish and Eastman Kodak. I propose an approach to
judging the lawfulness of product integration in technologically dynamic
markets that supplements the Supreme Court's current standard with four
additional steps in cases of tying of computer software. Thereafter, I examine
the D.C. Circuit's approach to software integration, which arose from that
court's 1998 interpretation, in Microsoft II, of an antitrust consent decree
between the US. Department of Justice and Microsoft Corporation. I argue
that the D.C. Circuit's rule has general applicability and should be recognized
as the appropriate standard for software integration under antitrust law. I
show how my approach imparts greater clarity to the D.C. Circuit's rule. I
examine the competing product integration rule proposed in 2000 by
Professor Lawrence Lessig as amicus curiae in the government's subsequent
antitrust case against Microsoft, concerning the integration of Internet
Explorer and Windows 98. My approach enables Professor Lessig's analysis
to be reconciled with the D.C. Circuit's rule, but Professor Lessig's rule, on
its own, would contain serious shortcomings. Thereafter, I evaluate Judge
Thomas Penfield Jackson's April 2000 findings of law on the integration of
Internet Explorer and Windows 98. I conclude that Judge Jackson's
approach, in contrast to the D.C. Circuit's rule as refined by my approach,
would harm consumers in the technologically dynamic market for computer
software.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the great challenges in antitrust law today is articulating the
proper rule by which to judge the lawfulness of product integration involving
software. Unlike the smokestack industries that have produced most of the
antitrust jurisprudence on tie-ins, software is subject to low marginal costs,
network effects, and rapid technological innovation. The need for a properly
tailored rule for product integration for software is manifested in the growth
of the Internet and electronic commerce, which in turn is accelerating the
convergence of the information-based industries that heretofore had distinct
identities in the minds of consumers, managers, and government officials.
Today, computing, entertainment, financial services, retailing, and
telecommunications--to name only the most obvious-are industries whose
output can be aggregated on a common electronic platform for delivery to
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consumers. In the "New Economy," will such aggregations of software
functionalities be praised as beneficial to consumers, or will they be
condemned as unlawful tie-ins?
In Part II, I examine the economic theories of why firms integrate
software products. In Part III, I review the Supreme Court's most recent
jurisprudence on tying-the 1984 decision in Jefferson Parish Hospital
District No. 2 v. Hyde, and the 1992 decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services, Inc.,-and consider why those decisions are
inadequate to address tying in technologically dynamic markets. In Part IV, I
propose an approach to the law of tying arrangements, the overarching
purpose of which is to instill within tying doctrine a filter that discriminates
between technologically mature and technologically dynamic product
markets. In Part V, I explain why my proposed rule is consistent with the
leading case on product integration for software, the 1998 decision by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v.
Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft 11).3
In Part VI, I shift to the 1999 antitrust trial of Microsoft, which dealt
with the company's practices concerning the design and marketing of the
Windows 98 operating system and the Internet Explorer Web browser. I
briefly summarize the portions of Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson's findings
of fact that are relevant to the question of whether Microsoft engaged in
unlawful tying of Internet Explorer to Windows 98 in violation of § I of the
Sherman Act. An understanding of these factual findings is essential to
understanding how different outcomes would result from different possible
product integration rules.
In Part VII, I consider, as an alternative to the rule of Microsoft 1I and to
my proposed approach, the product integration rule that Professor Lawrence
Lessig, then of Harvard Law School, advocated in the amicus brief that he
filed in the government's current Microsoft case at the request of Judge
Jackson after the judge issued findings of fact.4 Professor Lessig's analysis
helps to clarify the D.C. Circuit's product integration rule in Microsoft II,
and it is potentially reconcilable with the approach that I propose. However,
Professor Lessig's rule does not provide a basis for departing from an
application of Microsoft II in the current Microsoft case or in general.
In Part VIII, I analyze, as a second alternative to the rule of Microsoft II,
Judge Jackson's April 2000 conclusion of law in the Microsoft case as it
1 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
2 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
3 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Microsoft II].
4 Brief of Professor Lawrence Lessig as Amicus Curiae at 1, United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1233) [hereinafter Lessig Amicus Brie].
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pertains to the integration of Windows 98 and Internet Explorer.5 Judge
Jackson declined to apply Microsoft 1H and, indeed, said that it is inconsistent
with Supreme Court precedent. To a lesser extent, he relied on elements of
the reasoning underlying Professor Lessig's proposed rule. I explain why
Judge Jackson's rule would be less likely to maximize consumer welfare
than the rule of Microsoft II, as refined by my proposed approach.
I. Why Integrate Software?
Some of the traditional economic explanations for product bundling
more accurately fit smokestack industries than software. The network effects,
low marginal costs, and rapid technological change in software create
rationales for product integration that are both less familiar and more subtle
than the bundling arguments that courts have previously encountered. It is
important to establish the range of economic benefits to consumers that may
flow from the integration of software, because those consumer-welfare
effects will, of course, be the criterion by which courts select the optimal
antitrust rule in this area. In the remainder of Part II, I first review the
traditional Chicago School rationales for the efficiency of product bundling. I
then examine the "post-Chicago" procompetitive explanations for bundling
software products. Finally, I address the post-Chicago theories of
anticompetitive bundling and ask whether they apply to the software
industry.
A. Chicago School Explanations for the Efficiency of Product Bundling
The Chicago School of antitrust analysis produced several familiar
economic rationales for why product integration might be procompetitive or
efficiency-enhancing.6 I consider the major rationales and their possible
relevance to the Microsoft case.
1. Price-Discrimination
The original motivation for product bundling offered by Chicago School
economists was price-discrimination.7 The Court's modem jurisprudence on
5 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Microsoft
Findings ofLaw].
6 Portions of the following discussion draw from J. Gregory Sidak, Debunking Predatory In-
novation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1121 (1983).
7 George J. Stigler, United States v. Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block Booking, 1963 SUP. CT.
REv. 152.
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tying, such as Jefferson Parish,8 recognizes that tie-ins between goods used in
variable proportions may be motivated by the desire to price-discriminate.9 A
tie-in can be used to price-discriminate if (1) the tying firm possesses market
power in the tying product market, (2) the tied and tying products (a) are
used in variable proportions and (b) are complementary, and (3) the
willingness of consumers to pay for a system depends, at least to some
extent, on the number of times they intend to use it. The use of tying to effect
price-discrimination is likely to enhance social welfare because it tends to
induce the monopolist to increase output to the socially optimal level, which
would obtain under competitive conditions, thus eliminating the deadweight
loss of a single-price monopoly strategy. A firm that successfully price-
discriminates manages to make each consumer pay the most that she is
willing to spend for a given product-that is, her "reservation price."0
Many of the litigated allegations of technological tying and predatory
innovation in the late 1970s and early 1980s involved tie-ins of inputs used
in variable proportions.II One of the earliest reported cases, Automatic Radio
Manufacturing Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,12 involved a fixed-proportion
technological tie-in that seems quaint when compared with the complexity of
the technological tying claims that have been alleged in recent years in the
computer software and hardware industries. Ford changed its dashboard
8 466 U.S. 2, 14-15 (1984).
9 E.g., WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
APPRAISAL 76-88 (1973); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE
L.J. 19, 23-24 (1957); Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.
L. REV. 281, 291-92 (1956). For a later explication and application of the price-discrimination theory of
tying, see William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analy-
sis, 76 YALE L.J. 267 (1966).
10 E.g., HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 153, 416 (3d ed. 1992). Later propo-
nents of the price-discrimination view recognized that bundling is advantageous when valuations of the
goods are negatively correlated. E.g., Richard Schmalensee, Commodity Bundling by Single-Product
Monopolies, 25 J.L. & ECON. 67 (1982). When a firm must charge one price to customers, variability in
customer valuations undermines that firm's ability to capture consumer surplus. To the extent that bun-
dling reduces the variability of valuations, it can be used to capture a greater share of consumer surplus
and thus increase profits. Under this assumption, bundling would have its greatest advantage when the
valuations of the two products are perfectly negatively correlated.
II In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Kodak litigation and IBM peripheral-device litigation
involved technological tie-ins of variable proportions. Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703
F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1983); California Computer Prods., Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.
1979); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979); Transamerica Computer Co. v.
Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), affd and modified on other grounds, 698 F.2d
1377 (9th Cir. 1983); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal.
1978), aff'd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam);
Telex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okia. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d
894 (10th Cir. 1975). In all of these cases the plaintiff was a competitor. See also Rapid Print, Inc. v. Minn.
Mining & Mfg. Co., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,787 (D. Mass. Jan. 30, 1981) (granting defendant
summary judgment in a suit by a consumer under § 2 claiming that the defendant had extracted excessive
profits by designing a technological tie-in).
12 272 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mass. 1967), aff'd, 390 F.2d 113 (1st Cir. 1969).
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design so that a radio could not be installed without the dealer first
purchasing from Ford a dashboard plate with holes to accommodate the
radio. Even this case may be viewed as involving inputs used in variable
proportions, because a car may either have a radio or not have one (unlike,
say, a transmission that is necessary for the car to function).
For at least three reasons, the traditional Chicago School analysis of
tying as price-discrimination does not shed light on Microsoft's integration
of Internet Explorer into the Windows operating system. First, as Dean
Richard Schmalensee noted in his 1999 testimony in the Microsoft case, in
the traditional tying case "there is a significant incremental cost of adding the
tied product to the tying product, and these costs are not reduced
substantially as a result of bundling."3 In the case of software, however, the
incremental cost of product bundling is low. That low incremental cost of
adding features or functionalities can make possible consumer-welfare-
enhancing strategies that are not possible for a firm that faces relatively high
incremental costs of product integration.
Second, the incremental price that Microsoft charged for the integration
of Internet Explorer into Windows 98 was zero. Thus, as Dean Schmalensee
has noted, one cannot condemn Microsoft's bundling of Internet Explorer
and Windows 98 on the belief that it will enable the producer to charge
supracompetitive prices for the tied product.14
Third, such bundling does not fit the traditional Chicago School
explanation that a tying arrangement facilitates price-discrimination by
metering consumer demand. The consumer with a low price elasticity of
demand does not purchase multiple Internet Explorer Web browsers. Nor is
her Web browser priced on the basis of her frequency or intensity of use.
2. Risk Bearing
A strategy of price-discrimination through product bundling may have
desirable welfare effects other than the tendency to reduce deadweight loss by
increasing output to the competitive level. Because of limited information and
risk aversion, consumers might actually favor a pricing strategy for a new
product system that would discriminate on the basis of intensity of use. For
some products, especially brand new ones, a consumer will be uncertain how
strongly she really demands the product, so that ex ante the producer cannot
accurately ascertain the price elasticity of demand for the new system and thus
13 Direct Testimony of Professor Richard L. Schmalensee on behalf of Microsoft Corp., 522,
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would have trouble identifying a single profit-maximizing price.15 This is
especially true for a product system that embodies nonobvious or nonintuitive
information: The consumer can only fully evaluate the product's utility to her
ex post by actually using the system. This problem is merely another example
of Kenneth Arrow's general insight that "there is a fundamental paradox in the
determination of demand for information; its value for the purchaser is not
known until he has the information, but then he has in effect acquired it
without cost."16 Although it is plausible that a software manufacturer, such as
Microsoft, seeks to reduce consumer risk of this sort and that product bundling
may facilitate that objective (for reasons to be explained shortly), that result
would not flow from a strategy of pice-discrimination based on metering, as
none appears to take place.
3. Quality Control
A tie-in also can be used to ensure proper performance of a product
system, and the usefulness of this quality-control function, which is intended to
preclude the consumer's use of the possibly inferior or incompatible
components of a rival producer, does not depend on whether the tie-in is of
fixed or variable proportion.17 Courts have long recognized the protection of
product quality to be a limited affirmative defense to the per se rule against
contractual tie-ins. In United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., the court held
that service contracts tied to a new antenna system were lawful during the
period of the product's "inception," but that such contracts violated § I of the
Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act after circumstances changed and the
quality-control need for compulsory service contracts disappeared.18
This quality-control function is important when the consumer has a
limited understanding of how the system works and thus might erroneously
blame the producer of the system for a malfunction caused by an inferior or
incompatible component manufactured by a competitor, who will
consequently escape the full cost of consumer dissatisfaction and hence the full
retribution of the marketplace. In a case involving the tying of automobile
parts, one court observed:
Although there have been no examples presented by either side of
specific incidents of engine failure resulting from the plaintiff's
15 See, e.g., 466 U.S. at 27-28.
16 KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 152 (2d ed. 1974).
17 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 379-81 (1993);
Tyler Baker, The Supreme Court and the Per Se Tying Rule: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 66 VA. L. REv. 1235,
1257-58, 1277-78 (1980).
18 187 F. Supp. 545, 560-61 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'dper curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
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[compatible] instruments malfunctioning, there is ample indication that if
and when this may occur, the delineation of responsibility between the
plaintiff and defendant regarding who will ultimately bear the liability is
far from clear, thus resulting either in customer dissatisfaction, or in the
defendant assuming a disproportionate share of the liability, rather than
jeopardize its consumer goodwill. 19
If the courts are willing to acknowledge the possible value of product bundling
when the products are as straightforward as engines and instruments, then this
economic rationale in defense of tie-ins should hold with even greater force
when the products are software.
B. Post-Chicago Anticompetitive Explanations for the Bundling of
Software Products
Several anticompetitive theories developed by post-Chicago scholars
could potentially explain the bundling of software. In the following section, I
review these theories and discuss whether their underlying assumptions are
plausible in the context of software integration.
1. Monopoly Leveraging into the Browser Market
The idea that bundling could extend market power into a second market
was largely discredited by the Chicago School.20 In particular, a firm with a
monopoly in good A gains no advantage by selling A only as part of a bundle
with a competitively supplied good B. Because B is freely available at its
marginal cost (as a result of perfect competition), a consumer who buys the
bundle would also be willing to buy A alone at the same profit margin for the
monopolist. The idea of monopoly leveraging and other anticompetitive
rationales for bundling, however, have resurfaced in the economic literature
in recent years. In particular, Professor Michael Whinston produced a model
showing that the Chicago School critique of leveraging theory only applies
when the tied market is perfectly competitive.21 In his model, tying commits
the monopolist to being more aggressive than the entrant, and this
commitment discourages entry. Professor Whinston shows that tying could
be used to deter entry into, and thereby monopolize, the tied product market
19 Teflex Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 293 F. Supp. 106, 110 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
20 For the classic critiques of the monopolist's incentive to exclude a competitor's product in a
complementary market (and for the classic efficiency justifications for tying), see BORK, supra note 17;
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); and Director & Levi, supra
note 9.
21 Michael Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990).
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if(1) the selling firm is a monopolist in the tying product market, (2) the tied
product market has decreasing average costs over the relevant range of
output, and (3) the tied and tying products are used in variable proportions. 22
Whinston finds, however, that the predicted welfare effects of even that
specialized case of tying are ambiguous.23
Other recent theoretical papers have examined how bundling can be
used as a commitment device. One paper finds that bundling gives the
monopolist a greater incentive to engage in cost-cutting research and
development and thus helps to preserve and extend its advantageous
position.24 Again, however, the predicted welfare effects of that theoretical
result are ambiguous. In a different theoretical paper, Professor Barry
Nalebuff has demonstrated that bundling reduces the entrant's potential
profits while mitigating the incumbent's profit loss if entry occurs.2 5 Hence,
bundling is credible even without any commitment device. Professor
Nalebuff also shows that even if there are no cost savings or value-creating
synergies, the incumbent firm still has an incentive to engage in bundling for
its entry-deterrence effect.26 He explains that software is a good candidate for
bundling because the marginal costs of producing software are low-as
marginal costs rise, bundling creates an inefficiency because some
consumers are forced to buy the bundle even though they value the
components at less than their production costs. 27
2. Preservation of Monopoly in the Operating System Market
Professors Dennis Carlton and Michael Waldman have extended
Whinston's work on the leverage theory of bundling to investigate how the
tying of complementary products can be used to preserve a monopoly
position in the market for one of the products.28 Under this scenario, a
monopoly firm operates in its primary market and in a market for a
complementary good, in which it competes with an alternative producer. The
monopoly firm has an incentive to tie if there is a threat of entry by the
22 Id. at 854 n.24.
23 Id. at 855-56.
24 Jay Pil Choi, Tying and Innovation: A Dynamic Analysis of Tying Arrangements, (1998)
(Working Paper, on file with the YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION); see also Jay Pil Choi & Christodou-
los Stefanadis, Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory, RAND J. ECON. (forthcoming).
25 Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier (1999) (Working Paper, on file with the YALE
JOURNAL ON REGULATION)
26 Id. at 4.
27 Id.
28 DENNIS W. CARLTON & MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE STRATEGIC USE OF TYING TO PRESERVE
AND CREATE MARKET POWER IN EVOLVING INDUSTRIES (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper #145) (1999) (on file with the YALE JOURNAL OF REGULATION).
Yale Journal on Regulation
alternative producer into the primary market. Professors Carlton and
Waldman use dynamic models that point to the monopolist's ability to deter
entry of efficient firms into the monopolist's primary market and related
markets. They find that tying will preserve monopoly power in the primary
market whenever the alternative producer in the tied market faces entry
costs, or the demand for the complementary good is characterized by
network effects. With respect to policy implications, however, Professors
Carlton and Waldman suggest that any efficiencies from tying should be
weighed against potential consumer harm, and that "efficiencies achieved
through physical integration . . . should receive greater weight than
efficiencies achieved through contract."29
Much of the government's economic theory in the 1999 trial of
Microsoft focused on an elaborate version of this theory of anticompetitive
tying.30 This economic theory was first presented in detail in the pretrial
declaration of Professor David Sibley on behalf of the government in May
1998.31 There, Professor Sibley proposed that Microsoft's actions to put in
place contracting restrictions and to distribute the Internet Explorer (IE)
browser tied to its Windows operating system (OS) for free were an attempt
to preserve its OS monopoly.32 To support his argument, Professor Sibley
pointed to the case of a monopoly with allegedly exclusionary practices in a
complementary market that it serves, where the general conclusion has been
that
if the price level in the complement's market is limited by competitive
forces, then in the absence of efficiency justifications . . . . the
monopolist's control over the bottleneck input does not give it any profit
incentive to restrict or exclude a competitor's product in the
complement's market ... [because] ... control over the bottleneck input
allows the monopolist to extract value from consumers no matter whose
version of the complementary good the consumer buys. 33
Applied to the Microsoft case, Professor Sibley stated, the bottleneck input is
Microsoft's operating system, while the complementary product is the
browser.34 He maintained that the threat to Microsoft's alleged OS monopoly
arose because browsers expose their own application programming interfaces
29 Id. at 38.
30 One commentator has dubbed this strategy "defensive leveraging." Robin Cooper Feldman,
Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2098-99 (1999).
31 Declaration of David S. Sibley 49, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C.
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(APIs), a condition that enables browsers to serve as a software applications
platform independent of the underlying OS; in turn, the existence of a
competing platform would break down the so-called "applications barrier to
entry" in the PC operating systems market. A new entrant in the OS market,
Professor Sibley reasoned, "would not have to create an installed base of
software applications complementary to its OS and comparable to
Microsoft's in its size and use in order to succeed."35 Instead, applications
that were written to the browser platform would be accessible to a user
employing any OS that supported that browser.
Today, profits from browsers are usually generated from Internet-
related businesses, such as referral fees from Internet access providers (IAPs)
and advertising revenues. 36 Professor Sibley proposed that Microsoft has
"incurred an opportunity cost by foregoing the additional value it could have
extracted from consumers"-or from original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs), lAPs, and Internet content providers (ICPs)-that wanted to use
Navigator.37 One of his examples of the forgone value that Microsoft could
have obtained had it not placed restrictions that prevented OEMs, lAPs, and
ICPs from offering Navigator was Microsoft's "provision of free space on its
Channel Bar to ICPs who were willing to pay a positive price for placement
on the Channel Bar."38 Professor Sibley posited that Microsoft was willing to
incur that opportunity cost to preserve its alleged OS monopoly: "[I]f these
restrictions were aimed solely at expanding Microsoft's profits in Internet-
related markets by increasing IE browser usage, it could do better by
capturing such profits through the price of its OS, or through selling Internet
products tied to the OS (such as desktop space and ISP referral fees)."39
For reasons known only to the government, Professor Sibley was not
used as an expert witness at trial. Thus, although Sibley introduced the
monopoly preservation theory for the integration of Internet Explorer into
Windows 98, his pretrial declaration did not become part of the trial record.
Instead, Dr. Frederick R. Warren-Boulton and Professor Franklin M. Fisher
became the government's principal proponents of that theory at trial. Dr.
Warren-Boulton described the basis for the theory as follows:
Because of the nature of the barriers to entry created by network effects,
the most likely long-term threat to Microsoft's monopoly power does not
come directly from other operating systems, but rather from the spread of
35 Id. 50.
36 Id. 45 (explaining that while browsers are distributed for free, a potential source of browser




Yale Journal on Regulation
cross-platform technologies, that can serve (like Microsoft's operating
system) as a platform to which application developers write ....
[A]lthough browsers may never develop into full-fledged operating
systems, browsers can serve as a platform to which application
developers write. Should application vendors use a browser platform
other than the Windows platform, the applications barrier to entry that
protects Microsoft's monopoly could be diminished, and competition in
the PC operating system market created. 40
Professor Fisher briefly addressed the issue of monopoly preservation in one
footnote of his 1998 pretrial declaration, in which he concurred with
Professor Sibley.41 At trial in 1999, however, Professor Fisher gave the
leveraging theory greater emphasis. He concluded his direct testimony by
saying: "Microsoft's conduct to create, preserve, and increase barriers to
entry includes . . . [t]ying its browser to the operating system, thereby
requiring companies to enter successfully the already monopolized operating
system market in order to compete successfully with Microsoft in supplying
browsers and thus severely hampering Netscape in browser competition."42
He did not, however, support that conclusion with any evidence.
In 2000, Professor Fisher, joined by Professor Daniel Rubinfeld (the
Antitrust Division's chief economist during the initial prosecution of the
Microsoft case), elaborated on the theory of using product integration to
preserve a monopoly over PC operating systems.43 They claim that only in
the absence of monopoly power is "bundling... likely to be harmless and..
. serve legitimate business purposes, because bundling is not a rational
anticompetitive strategy for a firm that lacks significant market power."44
They contend that, because Microsoft has monopoly power over PC
operating systems, it has an incentive to engage in anticompetitive and
40 Declaration of Frederick R. Warren-Boulton 8-9, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147
F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (No. 98-1233).
41 Declaration of Franklin M. Fisher at 8 n.3, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (No. 98-1233) [hereinafter Fisher Declaration] ("Microsoft's bundling of IE with the
Windows software it distributes through retail channels is a similar effort to weaken Microsoft's browser
competition in order to protect Microsoft's dominance in operating systems.").
42 Direct Testimony of Franklin Fisher 22, United States v. Microsoft Corp., (D.D.C. 1999)
(No. 98-1233) [hereinafter Fisher Direct Testimony]; see also Franklin M. Fisher, The IBM and Microsoft
Cases: What's the Difference?, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 180 (2000).
43 Franklin M. Fisher & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, United States v. Microsoft: An Economic Analy-
sis, in DID MICROSOFT HARM CONSUMERS? Two OPPOSING VIEWS 1, 28-29 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center
for Regulatory Studies), available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/books/consumers.pdf.
44 Id. at 28-29; see also id. at 14-15, 23.
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unprofitable bundling of its Internet Explorer Web browser into the
Windows operating system. 45
C. Post-Chicago Procompetitive Explanations for the Bundling of
Software Products
The inclusion of Internet-related features in the operating system of a
personal computer potentially makes the operating system a better product
for Internet service vendors (ISVs) and consumers. Dean Richard
Schmalensee observed in his written direct testimony for the 1999 Microsoft
trial that bundling allows ISVs to "avoid having to write Internet-related
code themselves[,] and consumers get Internet-related functionality with
their operating system as well as applications programs that use this
functionality in creative ways."46 Bundling of features is common in
software. For example, almost all word processing programs sold today have
spelling checkers and grammar checkers built into them. Almost all
spreadsheet packages have graphic components that enable users to convert
spreadsheet data into pie charts and other graphics. In these cases, consumers
are charged a single price for the product and do not pay extra for particular
features of that product, even if earlier versions of that product did not
include those features.
There are at least three economic reasons why firms in unquestionably
competitive industries bundle features. 47 First, bundling allows the firm to
respond to the diversity of valuations across software customers. Second,
bundling stimulates demand for the firm's complementary features and
products. Third, bundling generates revenue for the firm's ancillary services.
In each case, bundling tends to increase demand even if the combination of
45 Cf. at 14-15. It is not clear how Professors Fisher and Rubinfeld reconcile this argument with
their concession that Microsoft's integration into Windows 98 of the Interet Explorer Web browser was
not, by itself, necessarily anticompetitive. Id. at 23-26.
Other theoretical work on product integration examines how bundling can facilitate market seg-
mentation or collusion among rival firms. See Jose Carbajo, David de Meza & Daniel J. Seidmann, A
Strategic Motivation for Commodity Bundling, 38 J. INDUS. ECON. 283 (1990) (theorizing that, if firm A
bundles (and refuses to sell its products separately) while firm B does not, then firm A can target high-
value customers and leave firm B to serve low-value customers not served by firm A); Yongmin Chen,
Equilibrium Product Bundling, 70 J. Bus. 85 (1997) (theorizing that bundling can facilitate collusion by
allowing rival firms to divide the market).
46 Schmalensee Direct Testimony, supra note 13, 235.
47 For a detailed discussion of these explanations, see Steven Davis, Jack MacCrisken & Kevin
Murphy, Integrating New Features into the PC Operating System: Benefits, Timing, and Effects on Inno-
vation (Sept. 1998), at http://www.chipar.com/papers/integration.pdf. These consumer benefits should not
be confused with network effects, which accrue with growth in the adoption of the particular product or
standard. For a discussion of the network effect issues presented by the Microsoft case, see Howard A.
Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. (forthcom-
ing, 2001).
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features included in a product does not improve the performance or quality
of the product in a strictly technical sense. Bundling tends to expand output
and is therefore procompetitive.
1. Responding to Diversity of Buyer Valuations for Software
Bundling features together increases the number of consumers who will
buy a product at a given price. Professors Yannis Bakos and Erik
Brynjolfsson have observed that manufacturers can increase sales by
increasing the diversity of buyers to which a product appeals, especially for
information goods for which the additional cost to the manufacturer of
including and distributing features is low.48 Using E-library as an example,
they explain why it makes economic sense for the vendor to provide "access
to a bundle of 150 newspapers, 800 magazines, 2,000 works of literature,
18,000 photos, and thousands of additional information goods for a fixed
price of $59.95 per year for individual users." 49
One could make an analogous argument about the myriad sections
contained in the Sunday New York Times. The marginal cost to the
newspaper of providing the book review section to someone interested only
in the sports section is zero. That condition holds regardless of the fact that
the New York Review of Books can exist as a free-standing (unbundled)
substitute for the New York Times Book Review. Indeed, the marginal cost to
the New York Times of stripping the New York Times Book Review from the
newspaper going to subscribers who read only the sports section would be
astronomical. If priced on an avoided-cost basis, the stripped-down Sunday
New York Times would cost more than the fully integrated newspaper.
Dean Schmalensee explains why this rationale is even more powerful
for Microsoft's bundling of its Windows operating system and Internet
Explorer Web-browsing software:
It is virtually costless to distribute Web-browsing software with the
operating system. Although some users may not want to browse the Web
or may not want to use the Web-browsing software that is included with
the operating system, others will want to browse the Web with the
included software. The operating system vendor can therefore increase
sales by including Web-browsing software with the operating system. In
fact, all major operating system vendors include Web-browsing software
with the operating system at no extra charge.50
48 Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits and Effi-
ciency, MGMT. SCI. (forthcoming, 2000).
49 Id.
50 Schmalensee Direct Testimony, supra note 46, 241.
Vol. 18:1, 2001
An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration
To support that analysis, Dean Schmalensee points to Central Point Software
Inc.'s PC Tools and America Online's Internet service software as examples
of how software firms use bundling to increase buyer diversity.51 For
example, by including many tools in one package, Central Point Software
attracted more consumers who found some combination of the tools to be
worth the price. Similarly, for $21.95 per month, AOL provides unlimited
access to a wide range of services, including stock quotes, foreign exchange
and commodity market information, weather reports, chat rooms, and e-mail,
as well as Internet access. Indeed, AOL and other Internet portals can be
regarded as electronic shopping malls that present the consumer with a
preselected portfolio of services. One would expect Microsoft to integrate
additional features into its Windows operating system for the same reason.
2. Stimulating Demand for Complementary Products and Features
Companies also have an incentive to bundle products if they are
complements. Suppose that the demand for product B increases if consumers
also have product A. If a company produces both products, it has an incentive
to lower the price of product A to stimulate sales of product B (This assumes,
of course, that demand and cost elasticities are such that the profits lost from
decreasing the price of A are less than the profits gained by the increased
sales of B). The company may actually have an incentive to give product A
away for free under some conditions.52
Dean Schmalensee suggests several ways in which demand
complementarities give Microsoft incentives to include Internet-related
functionality in the Windows operating system. First, demand
complementarities may plausibly exist between the operating system and
applications software produced by ISVs. By including Internet-related
functionality in the Windows operating system, Microsoft, in effect,
increases the demand for the operating system that runs those applications. 53
Second, demand complementarities may plausibly exist between the
Windows operating system and applications software produced by Microsoft.
By including Internet-related functionality in the operating system, Microsoft
increases the demand for its own applications products that make use of this
51 Id. 238-41.
52 For the classic example, see R. G. D. ALLEN, MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS FOR ECONOMISTS
362 (1964). See also Richard Schmalensee, Monopolistic Two-Part Pricing Arrangements, II BELL J.
ECON. 445 (1981). An analogous argument formed the basis for the economic critique of the antitrust rule
against maximum resale price fixing in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 155 (1968), which the Su-
preme Court eventually overruled in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
53 Schmalensee Direct Testimony, supra note 13, 244.
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Internet-related functionality.54 Third, demand complementarities may
plausibly exist between various features within the Windows operating
system. The demand for file management and hardware driver features of the
operating system may be higher for users who use the Internet. Therefore, by
providing Internet-related functionality at no additional cost, Microsoft can
increase the demand for the other features of the Windows operating system
and thereby increase sales55
3. Generating Revenue from Ancillary Services
Professor Benjamin Klein provides a third explanation for why Web-
browsing software is often distributed for free, either by itself, bundled with
other products, or integrated into other products56 In particular, Professor
Klein explains that a firm that persuades consumers to use its Web-browsing
software can obtain revenue from several different sources.5 7 For example,
both Netscape and Microsoft sell Internet and intranet server software,
Internet commerce applications, and Internet development tools. Similarly,
Professors Carlo Shapiro and Hal Varian observe that the free distribution of
a particular Web browser may enable the firm to generate "revenue streams
'adjacent' to the browser itself."58 Professors Stephen Davis and Kevin
Murphy reach the same conclusion59 They argue that the demand for
computer operating system software is highly complementary with
applications software and Web use; that the marginal cost of software
production is low, such that pricing these complementary functionalities at
zero may be efficient; and that product integration may be the most efficient
means of distribution for the consumer because it "eliminates the time and
effort to obtain and install the zero-price item." 60
Dean Schmalensee observed in his 1999 testimony in the Microsoft trial
that, during its first two years in business, Netscape earned 27.6 percent of its
54 Id. 245.
55 Id. 246.
56 Benjamin Klein, Microsoft's Use of Zero Price Bundling to Fight the Browser Wars, in
COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY (Jeffrey A. Eisenbach & Thomas M. Le-
nard eds., 1999); see also Benjamin Klein, An Economic Analysis of Microsoft's Conduct, ANTITRUST,
Fall 1999, at 38.
57 See Klein, An Economic Analysis of Microsoft's Conduct, supra note 56, at 40,46 nn.22, 23.
58 CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 294 (1999), cited in William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, The Dubious Search for
"Integration" in the Microsoft Trial, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1251, 1270 n.120 (1999).
59 See Steven J. Davis & Kevin M. Murphy, A Competitive Perspective on Internet Explorer,
90 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 184 (2000).
60 Id. at 185.
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gross revenues from the sales of such software to corporations.61 Because
advertising prices rise as more consumers are reached by the advertising, all
other factors being held constant, Netscape can earn more advertising
revenue from the "free" integration of Navigator into other software
products. As a result of these ancillary revenue sources, Dean Schmalensee
explains, the marginal opportunity cost to Microsoft of distributing another
copy of Web-browsing software may be negative:
It costs virtually nothing to distribute another copy of the Web-browsing
software. But that copy results in nontrivial additional revenue from the
sales of ancillary products. It is plausible that the additional revenues
exceed the direct cost of distribution, so that the effective cost of
distribution of another copy is less than zero (that is, it "pays" rather than
"costs" to distribute another copy) .... The "negative marginal cost" of
distributing Web-browser software is a further procompetitive reason for
why Microsoft would include such software with its operating system. 62
This reasoning contradicts the government's theory of predatory pricing
claims in the current Microsoft case. As Howard Shelanski and I explain at
length elsewhere,63 Judge Jackson rejected such reasoning when he
concluded in April 2000 that Microsoft's integration of Internet Explorer into
Windows 98 constituted attempted monopolization in violation of § 2 of the
Sherman Act.64
D. Summation
In recent years, economists have produced a variety of procompetitive
and anticompetitive theories for product bundling, including software
integration. The sophistication of these economic models counsels courts to
consider carefully whether a given theory of product integration applies to
the specific facts of an antitrust case. Although recent economic research
provides grist for legal theories of anticompetitive behavior, that research
also provides a rich basis upon which courts could find that consumer
benefits might plausibly result from the bundling of software. The challenge
to legal theory that such economic analysis presents is to formulate an
antitrust rule for software integration that can reconcile existing case law
61 Schmalensee Direct Testimony, supra note 13, 247 (citing data from Netscape's SEC Form
IO-Qs).
62 Id. 248.
63 Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 47.
64 See Microsoft Findings of Law, supra note 5, at 38, 44.
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with the unique supply and demand characteristics that influence the nature
of competitive rivalry in technologically dynamic markets.
II. The Supreme Court's Jurisprudence on Tying After Jefferson Parish
and Eastman Kodak
A tie-in exists when, for two separate products, A and B, a seller
requires consumers to buy B as a condition of selling them A. The Supreme
Court's classic definition in Northern Pacific states that a tie-in is "an
agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the
buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he
will not purchase that product from any other supplier."65 As a matter of
blackletter law, four elements are required to establish a per se unlawful tie-
in: (1) two separate products exist, (2) the sale of the tying product is
conditioned on the purchase of the tied product, (3) the defendant has market
power in the tying product, and (4) the tie-in forecloses a substantial amount
of potential sales of the tied product.66 Logically, of course, if the defendant
can show that two separate products do not exist, then the three remaining
elements of the four-part test evaporate. For that reason, the concept of
product integration (or its converse, product "separateness") is the linchpin
of the antitrust jurisprudence on tying arrangements. That question is also
one of great economic subtlety, for it implicates fundamental theoretical
questions of consumer demand and consumer welfare, particularly when
network effects are present.
Even within traditional antitrust doctrine, if two separate products are
shown to exist, product integration through a tie-in is not necessarily
unlawful. For years, the per se rule against tie-ins has not really been a per se
rule at all, as the courts have created various defenses for product integration
that can be shown in some respect to enhance consumer welfare or increase
economic efficiency.67 A specialized antitrust rule for the integration of
65 N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,5-6 (1958).
66 E.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992); Multistate
Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Profl Publ'ns, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1546 (10th
Cir. 1995).
67 "When the economic advantages of joint packaging are substantial the package is not appro-
priately viewed as two products, and that should be the end of the tying inquiry. The lower courts largely
have adopted this approach." Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 40 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (citing Foster v. Mar. State Say. & Loan Ass'n., 590 F.2d 928, 930-33 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1330 (5th Cir. 1976); Kugler v.
AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 460 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1972); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v.
Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 448 F. Supp. 228, 230 (N.D. Cal. 1978); United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp.,
187 F. Supp. 545, 563 (E.D. Pa. 1960), afid per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961)). "Consumer welfare and
economic efficiency are not synonymous. Economic efficiency connotes that state of affairs in which ...
no opportunity to promote the general welfare has been neglected. Such an opportunity is defined as the
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software would be a natural step in that progression. 68 But what would such a
rule be?
Currently, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on tying cannot say. The
most recent precedents under § 1 of the Sherman Act are the Court's 1984
decision in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde69 and its 1992
decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.70
Unfortunately, that jurisprudence has limited utility when applied to product
integration in a technologically dynamic network industry such as software.
It therefore seems inevitable that the Court will need to revisit the law of
tying in the specific context of software integration.71
A. The Jefferson Parish Decision
In Jefferson Parish, a hospital required its patients to seek services from
one firm of anesthesiologists.72 Although it was "far too late in the history of
our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying
arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore
are unreasonable 'per se,"'73 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, also
acknowledged that "not every refusal to sell two products separately can be
said to restrain competition." 74 Illegal tying arrangements were distinguished
by "the essential characteristic of ... forc[ing] the buyer into the purchase of
a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have
preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms." 75 In contrast, tying
arrangements used to maximize a seller's return on the tying product, were
not subject to per se condemnation, for they were not necessarily coercive or
anticompetitive.76
availability of a course of action that will benefit at least some individuals, in their own estimation, in a
way not achieved at the expense of others." WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD
COMPETITION IN LOCAL TELEPHONY 23-24 (1994). Consumer welfare is distinguishable from economic
efficiency in the sense that the latter connotes "the maximization of the general welfare of consumers and
producers-that is, the maximization of the sum of consumers' surplus and producers' surplus. Often this
criterion is referred to in the abbreviated form 'consumer welfare maximization."' Id. at 26.
68 Cf. Sidak, supra note 6 (advocating in 1983 a rule of per se legality for product innovations
achieved through product integration).
69 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
70 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
71 I wholeheartedly agree with Professor Lessig when he predicts: "Inthe context of tying gen-
erally, and the tying of software products in particular, it is my view that there is a significant probability
that the Supreme Court will modify current doctrine." Lessig Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 7.
72 466 U.S. at 6.
73 Id. at 9.
74 Id. at 11.
75 Id. at 12.
76 Id. at 14.
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Insofar as no Justice dissented, Jefferson Parish might be regarded as an
easy case. However, the concurring opinions reveal that the real debate
between the Justices concerned the wisdom of the per se rule. 77 In her
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor (joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Rehnquist and Powell) criticized the per se rule for requiring courts
to conduct a fact-intensive inquiry into the real-world economic effects of
tie-ins while denying them the ability to permit tie-ins that were shown to be
beneficial. 78 Justice O'Connor's approach would evaluate tying arrangements
according to the rule of reason, which would invalidate such arrangements in
the "rare cases where power in the market for the tying product is used to
create additional market power in the market for the tied product."79
Plaintiffs would have to meet a higher threshold for courts to consider
invalidating a tie-in per se, having to show that a seller had market power in
the tying-product market;80 that there existed a "substantial threat that the
tying seller will acquire market power in the tied-product market"1; and a
"coherent economic basis for treating the tying and tied products as
distinct."82 Finally, even if a plaintiff could make such a showing, a tie-in
could still be permitted if its economic benefits exceeded its harms.8 3
The most salient feature of Jefferson Parish-and the sharpest point of
disagreement between the majority opinion and the concurring opinions-
was the question of how to determine if the tying arrangement involved two
products or only one. According to the majority, "the answer to the question
whether one or two products are involved turns not on the functional relation
between them, but rather on the character of the demand for the two items."84
Under the majority's approach, two products are deemed to exist if sufficient
demand exists to create distinct and separate markets for both the tying and
the tied products.8 5 Justice O'Connor rejected such reasoning. She (and three
other Justices) thought it absurd to apply the majority's analysis to integrated
products:
All but the simplest products can be broken down into two or more
components that are "tied together" in the final sale. Unless it is to be
77 Compare id. at 32 (Brennan, J., concurring) (endorsing the per se rule), with id. at 32-47
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (opposing the per se rule in favor of an analysis of tie-ins under the rule of
reason).
78 Id. at 34 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
79 Id. at 36.
80 Id. at 37.
81 Id. at 38.
82 Id. at 39.
83 Id. at 41 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
84 Id. at 19.
85 Id. at 21-22.
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illegal to sell cars with engines or cameras with lenses, this analysis must
be guided by some limiting principle .... Even when the tied product
does have a use separate from the tying product, it makes little sense to
label a package as two products without also considering the economic
justifications for the sale of the package as a unit. When the economic
advantages of joint packaging are substantial the package is not
appropriately viewed as two products, and that should be the end of the
tying inquiry.86
In Eastman Kodak, the Court would revisit this issue of how to determine
whether an alleged tie-in involved two products or one.
B. The Eastman Kodak Decision
At issue in Eastman Kodak was whether, for tying law, replacement
parts and repair service for Kodak photocopiers are separate products.87 In an
opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court not only found that parts and service
were distinct markets,88 but also rejected Kodak's claim that, even if it held a
monopoly in the market for replacement parts for Kodak photocopiers,
interbrand competition among photocopier manufacturers made it impossible
for Kodak to exploit that market power.89
Eschewing Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Jefferson Parish, the Court
first found that parts and service could plausibly be considered separate
products because there was "sufficient consumer demand so that it is
efficient for a firm to provide service separately from parts." 90 The Court
appeared to have little patience for the seemingly intuitive claim that parts
and service could not constitute distinct markets because there was no
demand for parts separate from service: "By that logic, we would be forced
to conclude that there can never be separate markets, for example, for
cameras and film, computers and software, or automobiles and tires."91
Kodak, the Court observed, sold service with parts to some, service without
parts to others, and parts without service to yet other consumers. 92
In a dissent joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas, Justice Scalia
criticized the majority's reliance on "sufficient consumer demand" to find
that replacements parts and repair service were distinct markets.93 Not only
86 Id. at 39-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87 504 U.S. at 459.
88 Id. at 462-64.
89 Id. at 465-78.
90 , Id. at 462.
91 Id. at 463.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 494 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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was the repair service that Kodak provided "inherently associated with the
parts,"94 but customers tended to demand the two items in fixed proportions,
buying "one part with one unit of service necessary to install the part."95
Quoting Professors Areeda and Kaplow, Justice Scalia observed: "When that
situation obtains, 'no revenue can be derived from setting a higher price for
the tied product which could not have been made by setting the optimum
price.' 96 Such considerations "strongly suggest[ed] that Kodak parts and the
service involved in installing them should not be treated as distinct products
for antitrust tying purposes."97
Another disagreement between the majority and the dissenters was
whether a firm could violate the Sherman Act by tying products in derivative
aftermarkets (for example, tying service to replacement parts for Kodak
photocopiers) when competition existed in the equipment foremarket. The
majority was skeptical of Kodak's claim that competition among photocopier
manufacturers prevented it from raising prices of services and parts for its
machines. It is true that interbrand competition prevented Kodak from
charging any supracompetitive price that it might have wanted for parts and
services yet, such competition did not necessarily prevent Kodak from
charging some supracompetitive price, since "[t]he fact that the equipment
market imposes a restraint on prices in the after-markets by no means
disproves the existence of power in those markets."98
The check provided by interbrand competition upon exploitation of the
intraband market, according to the Court, was attenuated by Kodak's
horizontal relationship with competing providers of service. 99 High
information costs would prevent accurate life-cycle pricing, and most
consumers, the majority feared, would be unable to calculate the total cost of
equipment, replacement parts, and repair service.OO Furthermore, high
switching costs also allowed Kodak to exploit its customers, for "consumers
who already have purchased the equipment, and are thus 'locked in,' will
tolerate some level of service-price increases before changing equipment
brands. "l0
Justice Scalia, who had joined the Court since it had decided Jefferson
Parish, found the majority's analysis unconvincing. He reasoned that
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. (quoting PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 706, 426(a) (4th
ed. 1988)).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 471.
99 Id.n.18.
100 Id. at 473.
101 Id. at 476.
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virtually every manufacturer of durable goods enjoys some form of market
power with respect to unique products required for aftermarket support.
However, lacking interbrand market power, a firm could not "raise derivative
market prices generally by reducing quantity," because, if Kodak set
supracompetitive prices for parts or service, consumers would purchase
equipment from Kodak's competitors.102 The Court's concern over high
information and switching costs was, in Justice Scalia's opinion, unfounded,
for both kinds of transaction costs pervaded real-world markets without
attracting the concern of antitrust law.103 Consequently, "[a] tie between two
aftermarket derivatives does next to nothing to improve a competitive
manufacturer's ability to extract monopoly rents from its consumers."04
Applying the per se rule to single-brand aftermarket ties would achieve
nothing more than "releas[ing] a torrent of litigation and a flood of
commercial intimidation."105
III. Analyzing Product Integration in Technologically Dynamic Markets
Jefferson Parish and Eastman Kodak are not up to the task of guiding
the law of tie-ins as it applies to product integration in technologically
dynamic markets. Therefore, in this Part, I propose an approach to the law of
tying arrangements, the overarching purpose of which is to instill within
tying doctrine a filter that discriminates between technologically mature and
technologically dynamic product markets. Traditional tying doctrine largely
evolved from cases that fall in the former category. As a result, it should not
be surprising that the existing precedent is ill-suited to cases that fall in the
latter category.106
My purpose in this Article is not to indict all of tying law, or even to
argue that the per se rule be universally replaced with the rule of reason.
Rather, taking the existing state of the law as given, I argue that courts must
102 Id. at 495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 495-98.
104 Id. at 499.
105 Id. at 489.
106 In September 2000, Justice Breyer, dissenting from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari
for a direct appeal of Judge Jackson's decision, stated:
The [Microsoft] case significantly affects an important sector of the economy-a sector char-
acterized by rapid technological change. Speed in reaching a final decision may help create le-
gal certainty. That certainty, in turn, may further the economic development of that sector so
important to our Nation' s prosperity.
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 25 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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recognize the need to fashion a specialized tying rule for technologically
dynamic markets.
A. The Uninformative Preoccupation with "Separate Products"
I heartily agree with Professor Lessig that, in cases of software
integration, "what a 'product' is should not turn upon questions of
metaphysics."107 But I would take the point further. In a technologically
dynamic market, it is misguided (and potentially harmful to consumer
welfare) to dwell on the question of whether A and B are or are not "separate
products" for purposes of tying law, since the very definition of the relevant
product may be in constant flux. There are two broad difficulties with such
inquiry.
First, merely to cast the legal analysis in terms of the separateness or
cohesiveness of two "products" is to inject an implicit and biasing economic
assumption that technology in the market in question is static rather than
dynamic. My approach would defer to product integration that plausibly
benefited consumers either through the achievement of economies of scope
across two "products" (or functionalities) or through the stimulation of
demand for an integrated (rather than disintegrated) product.
Second, the question of separate products has become an intellectual
exercise that is required to do all the heavy lifting for an antitrust standard
that otherwise fails to ask the pertinent economic questions that affect
consumer welfare. This deficiency in the doctrinal intellectual tool kit
becomes especially apparent in cases involving technologically dynamic
markets, where courts seem to strain to prevent obvious consumer harm by
engaging in increasingly metaphysical inquiries into the integration and
separability of products. In essence, the courts, for lack of a hammer, are
reduced to pounding a nail with a screwdriver.
B. When Is a Market Technologically Dynamic?
If a more tolerant antitrust rule is to apply in technologically dynamic
markets, it is necessary to answer the anterior question of whether a
particular market under consideration is "technologically dynamic." It is
tempting to say that a technologically dynamic market, like pornography in
the eyes of the late Justice Potter Stewart, is something that we know when
we see it. Although the Microsoft litigation should not present a hard case of
line drawing in this regard, future cases may be more subtle. How, then,
107 Lessig Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 19.
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should a court make the threshold determination whether Jefferson Parish
and Eastman Kodak are the starting point or the ending point for antitrust
scrutiny of product integration?
Two kinds of questions seem informative. First, has the price-adjusted
performance of the product improved markedly over time? Alternatively, has
the price of the product fallen markedly, if one holds constant the level of
performance? In particular, has the performance of the product improved at a
rate faster than the rate of productivity growth in the economy as a whole? If
the answer to these questions is yes, then it is possible, perhaps likely, that
technological innovation (rather than exogenous changes in demand or
government regulation) has been the impetus.
A second question concerns the novelty of the product at issue. Does the
product reflect the creation of an entirely new source of consumer surplus?
Has an entirely new demand curve come into existence? Is the product one
for which virtually no demand at all existed only a few years before? One
can recall the rate of adoption (or "diffusion") of new products, such as
radios in the 1920s, televisions in the late 1940s and early 1950s, microwave
ovens, video cassette recorders, and cellular telephones. One can readily
imagine similar breakthroughs in product development in pharmaceuticals,
medical devices, biotechnology, and financial services. If the product is one
that is still in the steep portion of the S-shaped product life cycle curve, then
it is appropriately regarded as being in a market that is technologically
dynamic. In such a market, consumer knowledge is accumulating, and
product demand is still immature and unstable.
In addition to these two lines of economic examination, there are other
facts that might help to illuminate the degree to which a market is more
properly characterized as technologically dynamic rather than
technologically static. What are the numbers of patent applications and the
expenditures on R&D, both in absolute terms and in relation to the level of
output and to the levels observed in other markets? What is the pattern of
new business formations and business failures? Is there a highly mobile labor
market for skilled workers? What is the market capitalization of firms
relative to the replacement cost of their assets? To what extent are the stock
market returns to firms in the market correlated with those of a diversified
portfolio of industrial corporations, such as those in the Dow Jones Industrial
Index? The answers to such questions will supply facts that will elucidate the
two economic questions posed above.
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C. Four Proposed Steps for Evaluating Product Integration in
Technologically Dynamic Markets
A more specialized antitrust analysis of software integration would
begin after the four elements of Jefferson Parish and Eastman Kodak had
been proven. Then a court would ask four additional questions.
1. Step One: Is the Market Technologically Mature or
Technologically Dynamic?
The first additional step in my proposed approach asks whether the
market in question is technologically mature or technologically dynamic. If
the market is technologically mature, then the traditional four-part test for
tie-ins used in Jefferson Parish and Eastman Kodak applies. In such a
market, products are well-defined, both by the consumer demand that they
satisfy and by the production technology through which firms supply them.
In such a market, as opposed to a technologically dynamic market, it is far
more likely that a court can conclude with confidence that the tying product
and the tied product are indeed separate products. Jefferson Parish's focus
on the "character of demand" is coherent and judicially manageable. Hence,
the Supreme Court's signal cases on tie-ins have involved rather prosaic
combinations of goods, such as business machines and punch cards,108
mimeograph equipment and ink,109 salt machinery and salt.I10
If, on the other hand, the market is technologically dynamic, additional
elements are required before an instance of product integration can be found
to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. In such a case, competition exists for the
market in a Schumpeterian sense.' Consumer welfare will depend to a
greater extent on rivalry with respect to nonprice variables, such as quality
and innovation.12 As noted earlier, competition for the market can be viewed
as a contest to define entirely new demand curves or to push existing demand
curves outward with vastly improved combinations of price and
performance. Jefferson Parish's analysis of the "character of demand" is
incomplete and ambiguous. Consumers and producers are still in the midst of
discovering what the "character of demand" is likely to be. Any tying rule
that ignores this condition of demand uncertainty runs a great risk of harming
consumers.
108 Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
109 Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1,26,32 (1912).
110 Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
111 See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 47.
112 See Richard Schmalensee, Antitrust Issues in Schumpeterian Industries, 90
AM. ECON. REV. PAP. & PROC. 192 (2000).
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It bears emphasis that one need not cast the Schumpeterian nature of
competition in software markets as a consideration that speaks solely (or
even principally) to whether, for purposes of analyzing tying claims, two
kinds of functionalities constitute one product or two. Both the Areeda
treatise and Professor Lessig's amicus brief propose variants on the Jefferson
Parish rule that would consider the technologically dynamic nature of the
market; having considered such evidence, however, both would perpetuate
the stilted reasoning of tying doctrine by acting as though such evidence tells
us something useful about the "single product" question and nothing else.113
That is the wrong approach. It is more productive to candidly assert that the
Court's existing tying jurisprudence is inadequate to address technologically
dynamic markets, rather than to suggest that a subtler meaning of "single
product" is the means by which to recognize the importance in the law of
Schumpeterian competition. Professor Hovenkamp wisely does so in the
1999 supplement to the Areeda treatise.'14
2. Step Two: Is It Plausible that Consumers Will Benefit from
Subadditive Costs or Superadditive Demand Resulting from
Product Integration?
As a second additional step, the court asks whether it is plausible that
consumers will benefit from the product integration in question. As I will
show in Part V, this question is simply a restatement of the first component
113 At points in his amicus brief, Professor Lessig seems to recognize the failure of existing ty-
ing doctrine to incorporate considerations of Schumpeterian competition for the market. He notes that the
Areeda treatise proposes to modify Jefferson Parish in the case of computer software by considering no
less than six mitigating "single product" rationales. Lessig Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 32. (Of course,
any rule with six possible loopholes is no rule at all.) One such rationale is the "Competitive Market Prac-
tices" (CMP) rationale, which asks whether competitive firms in the market bundle products in the same
manner as the defendant firm. See 10 PHILLIP AREEDA, EINER ELHAUGE & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW § 1744 (1996). In a Schumpeterian market, however, it is quite possible and no reason
for alarm that there will be no observable competitors at any given moment, because competition for the
market occurs sequentially. Professor Lessig observes, and I agree, that: "If the defendant is the first to
bundle this new functionality, then there would be no historical practice against which to compare the
bundle. And if there were no historical practice, then the CMP test would no longer be a useful proxy for
determining whether it was efficient to provide the two items separately." Lessig Amicus Brief supra note
4, at 32. For that reason, the Areeda treatise proposes the "New Product" rationale, which asks whether
"the defendant's bundle causes the items to operate together in a way that had not been tried before."
AREEDA, ELHAUGE & HOVENKAMP, supra, 1746a. But, again, the focus is on whether the bundle of
items should be deemed a single product.
114 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 1746.1a (Supp. 1999) [hereinafter AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP 1999 SUPPLEMENT] ("The problem raised in the Microsoft [II] case illustrates the artificial-
ity of the separate products requirement ... for purposes of measuring the anticompetitive effects of Mi-
crosoft's bundling practice, it is of little importance whether the Windows 95 operating platform and the
Interet browser were once sold separately.").
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of the D.C. Circuit's Microsoft II rule. Such consumer benefits can come
from lower costs, increased demand, or both.
Increased demand results from product integration if there is
superadditivity of demand across two outputs, A and B, when they are
produced as an integrated product. The increased demand may result because
the product definition has changed as a result of the integration in a manner
that produces more satisfaction (utility) for consumers. Otherwise, it may
result because the integration of A and B reduces the cost to the consumer of
engaging in product assembly or integration on her own. Or, the increased
demand may result from some factor that is impossible to predict a priori, but
which is reflected, ultimately and objectively, in consumers' higher
willingness to pay.
Lower costs result from product integration if there is subadditivity of
costs across two outputs, A and B. This efficiency will unambiguously
benefit consumers, because even a monopolist's profit-maximizing price will
fall in the face of declining costs. Subadditivity of costs is present if a firm
with a given cost function "has lower costs than would an allocation of output
among two or more firms using the same costfunction. "115 In other words, it is
more efficient for the single firm to produce A and B as an integrated product
than it is for the firm (or multiple firms) to produce A separately from B.
Such efficiencies are also known as economies of scope. The firm's tech-
nology is said to exhibit economies of scope when it is less costly for one firm
to produce a set of goods jointly than for distinct firms to produce individual
goods or subsets of goods separately.' 6
The analysis of cost subadditivity also implicitly answers the question
of who-the producer or the consumer-is the more efficient integrator of
individual functionalities. As I will show in Part V, that information responds
to the second component of the D.C. Circuit's Microsoft II rule. Although it
may be feasible for the consumer to integrate separate functionalities, the
consumer may not be the lower-cost integrator. The superior efficiency of the
producer is a factual question whose answer depends on economies of scale
and scope, as well as learning-by-doing effects that allow the producer's unit
cost of product integration to fall over time, with its level of cumulative
output. Furthermore, as income levels rise (either over time or across
demographic segments of the population of consumers), the opportunity cost
115 J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE
REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 20 (1997).
116 Id. at 22. "[A]lthough natural monopoly implies economies of scope, the converse is not the
case. Most multiproduct firms derive economies of scope from joint production; it is a primary motivation
for companies to diversify their product offerings. That achievement of economies of scope does not
imply that those companies could serve their entire markets at lower cost than two or more firms." Id.
Vol. 18:1, 2001
An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration
of the consumer's time also rises, such that the consumer's implicit cost of
integrating products rises. Thus, rising income levels make the division of
labor (by which the producer's specialized capital and labor integrate
products) more significant. I will revisit this question of feasible versus
efficient integration of software products by the consumer when, in Part V, I
analyze the D.C. Circuit's software integration rule in Microsoft II.117
Over what possible states of the world should an antitrust court evaluate
a claim of consumer benefit from product integration? Is a consumer benefit
an improvement over an actual market outcome that previously existed? Or
should a consumer benefit also be evaluated relative to other hypothetical
states of the world? The answer to this question is important because it
reveals how one regards the proper role of antitrust law as an instrument of
economic policy. Although the government agreed that there was some
benefit to Microsoft's product integration, it seemed to regard such a benefit
as insufficient or illegitimate because, on one account, the integration created
a monopoly that impeded competition and therefore denied consumers access
to some alternative market structure in which the government hypothesized
that software would be even more advanced and prices even lower than in
the outcome that Microsoft had actually produced through its integration of
software.
This conception of the consumer-welfare standard in antitrust law is
misguided. It turns antitrust into a forward-looking industrial policy.
Antitrust intervention becomes an instrument of central planning that
embodies the fatal conceit that government enforcers and federal judges can
divine and rank alternative outcomes in highly uncertain markets subject to
rapid technological change.18 To prevent antitrust from being given that
unrealistic responsibility, it is appropriate for a court to reject hypothetical
comparisons and instead regard a consumer benefit as any current market
outcome that represents an improvement over a previous market outcome. In
the case of the integration of software products such as Windows and
Internet Explorer, the proper question, as the D.C. Circuit reasoned in
Microsoft HI 19 concerns the consumer benefits of the integrated product as it
has been designed, not as it could have been designed.120
117 See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
118 See J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust and the Federal Software Commission, JOBS & CAPITAL,
Winter 1997, at 18.
119 See Microsoft! , 147 F.3d 935, 950 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
120 Professor Lessig reads the Areeda treatise to pose a different consumer-welfare question
from that posed by the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft 11: Could the producer have designed separable products
so that the consumer could integrate them and achieve the same benefits as if the producer had done the
integration? Lessig Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 7 (citing 9 AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1730 (1991)).
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3. Step Three: Is It Probable That Integration Will Preserve a
Monopoly over the Tying Product by Substantially Reducing
Competition from the Tied Product?
Some may argue that, even though an instance of product integration
benefits consumers by achieving subadditive costs, superadditive demand, or
both, such integration will preserve a monopoly that the producer possesses
over the tying product. This concern rests on the theoretical possibility that
software integration may tend to preserve a monopoly over operating
systems by discouraging the development of alternative platforms made
possible by middleware. And, as I will explain in Part VI, this consideration
also responds to Professor Lessig's recommendation that courts consider
whether the tying and tied product are partial substitutes.
Of course, if no reduction in competition in the tying product's market
is discernible, then the inquiry ceases and the tying arrangement is deemed
lawful. On the other hand, if a reduction in competition is discernible, then
the court's inquiry advances to the next step, which concerns the ultimate
impact of the product integration on consumer welfare.
4. Step Four: Will the Reduction, If Any, in Competition Cause
Consumer Welfare Losses That Exceed the Consumer Welfare
Gains from Subadditive Costs or Superadditive Demand?
The final supplemental element to establish an unlawful tying
arrangement in a technologically dynamic market is a net loss in consumer
welfare. Unless the plaintiff can show that consumer welfare fell under the
integration of the software products or functionalities in question, there
should be no finding of liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act. As a factual
matter, this determination requires the court to compare (1) the welfare
losses to consumers from reduced competition in the market for the tying
product with (2) the welfare gains to consumers from the creation of
subadditive costs, superadditive demand, or both. A finding of liability
follows only if the first amount outweighs the second.
This kind of welfare tradeoff is familiar in antitrust law. In the late
1960s, Professor Oliver E. Williamson demonstrated the effects on consumer
welfare of a merger that restricts output (by raising prices) and lowers
marginal costs (by achieving certain productive efficiencies).121 To defend a
merger, according to Professor Williamson, the merging parties must
demonstrate that the cost savings achieved through greater efficiencies
121 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM.
ECON. REv. 18, 21 (1968).
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exceed the deadweight loss (the amount above costs that consumers would
be willing to pay for the lost output) to consumers. The Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have since embraced the
Williamsonian welfare tradeoff for both vertical122 and horizontal merger
analysis.123 Judge Robert Bork has argued that Williamson's insight can be
extended to any antitrust analysis.124 Thus, an application of the
Williamson's welfare tradeoff in the context of software integration presents
neither a novel nor a controversial mode of antitrust analysis.
D. Summation
If they are to advance consumer welfare, antitrust decisions concerning
software integration require a more sophisticated model of analysis than
Jefferson Parish and Eastman Kodak can provide. In addition to examining
the four traditional elements of unlawful tying employed in Jefferson Parish
and Eastman Kodak, a court should ask four additional questions. First, is the
market technologically mature or technologically dynamic? Second, is it
plausible that consumers will benefit from subadditive costs or superadditive
demand resulting from product integration? Third, is it probable that
integration will preserve a monopoly over the tying product by substantially
reducing competition from the tied product? Fourth, will the reduction, if
any, in competition cause consumer welfare losses that exceed the consumer
welfare gains from subadditive costs or superadditive demand? By asking
these four additional questions, a court will be more certain that its
assessment of the lawfulness of software integration will promote consumer
welfare.
122 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 1984, § 4.0 (stating that
as in the case of horizontal mergers, the Department will consider expected efficiencies in determining
whether to challenge a vertical merger).
123 Id. ("Because the antitrust laws, and thus the standards of the Guidelines, are designed to
proscribe only mergers that present a significant danger to competition, they do not present an obstacle to
most mergers. As a consequence, in the majority of cases, the Guidelines will allow firms to achieve
available efficiencies through mergers without interference from the Agency.").
124 Judge Bork writes: "[Williamson's framework] can be used to illustrate all antitrust prob-
lems, since it shows the relationship of the only two factors involved, allocative inefficiency and produc-
tive efficiency. The existence of these two elements and their respective amounts are the real issues in
every properly decided antitrust case. They are what we have to estimate-whether the case is about the
dissolution of a monopolistic firm, a conglomerate merger, a requirements contract, or a price fixing
agreement." ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 108 (1978).
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IV. The D.C. Circuit's Software Integration Rule Announced in
Microsoft II
My proposed antitrust rule for software integration can be reconciled
with significant lower court jurisprudence and academic proposals. In this
Part, I examine the leading case on product integration for software, United
States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft II). 125
In that 1998 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit interpreted, in an opinion by Judge Stephen F. Williams, §
IV(E)(i) of the Justice Department's 1994 consent decree with Microsoft, a
provision that prohibited Microsoft's tying of programs to its Windows
operating system. The D.C. Circuit read § IV(E) to allow product integration
if "the combination offered by the manufacturer [is] different from what the
purchaser could create from the separate products on his own" and if the
combination is "better in some respect."126 The court further said that "[t]he
question is not whether the integration is a net plus but merely whether there
is a plausible claim that it brings some advantage."127 The D.C. Circuit relied
on general antitrust principles to interpret the anti-tying provision in the
consent decree, though it left open the question "[w]hether or not this is the
appropriate test for antitrust law generally."128 The D.C. Circuit thus
evaluated in 1998 the relevance of Jefferson Parish and Eastman Kodak to
the precise kind of software integration issue that produced the government's
complaint later that year against Microsoft over the integration of the Internet
Explorer Web browser into the Windows 98 operating system. I argue that,
in cases decided according to antitrust law rather than according to principles
of interpretation for consent decrees, the D.C. Circuit's rule in Microsoft II,
as clarified by the four-step analysis presented above in Part IV, should
indeed be the product integration rule for software.
A. The Anti-Tying Provisions of the 1994 Microsoft Consent Decree
The D.C. Circuit in Microsoft II was not construing antitrust precedent
on a blank slate, but rather, it was interpreting § IV(E)(i) of the Justice
Department's 1994 consent decree with Microsoft, a provision that
prohibited Microsoft's tying of software products to the Windows operating
system. The court was thus ostensibly interpreting a contractual provision in
light of the intentions of the contracting parties. Practically speaking,
125 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
126 Id. at 949.
127 Id. at 950.
128 Id.
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however, the court relied upon general antitrust principles and precedent in
discerning both those intentions and the proper interpretation of the tying
prohibition contained in the consent decree. The D.C. Circuit's analysis and
underlying economic and legal rationales therefore apply equally to a claim
of tying in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act or § 3 of the Clayton Act.129
The D.C. Circuit's decision in Microsoft II arose from the district
court's preliminary injunction prohibiting Microsoft from requiring computer
manufacturers that were licensed to install the company's operating system
software, Windows 95, to also secure a license to install Microsoft's Internet
browser, Internet Explorer.130 Microsoft II concerned Windows 95 and the
proper interpretation of a consent decree. The government's 1999 trial
against Microsoft concerned Windows 98, and the government's theory of
liability in that case was predicated on the Sherman Act. Nevertheless, the
product tie-in issues in the two cases are for all practical purposes identical.
Because proper analysis of whether or not a product is truly integrated
depends on specific facts, it is necessary to set forth the basic facts of
Microsoft II in some detail. The case arose from Microsoft's practices in
marketing its Windows 95 operating system. The D.C. Circuit described an
operating system as "the central nervous system of the computer, controlling
the computer's interaction with peripherals such as keyboards and
printers."131 In the case of Windows 95, Microsoft "integrate[d] a DOS shell
with a graphical user interface," which supplied the now-familiar
"technology by which the operator performs functions not by typing at the
keyboard but by clicks of his mouse."132 The court distinguished operating
systems from "platforms:"
Operating systems also serve as "platforms" for application software such
as word processors. As the word "platform" suggests, the operating
system provides a basic support structure for an application via
"application programming interfaces" ("APIs"), which provide general
functions on which applications can rely. Each operating system's APIs
are unique; hence applications tend to be written for particular operating
systems. 133
The D.C. Circuit noted that "[t]he primary market for operating systems
consists of original equipment manufacturers ('OEMs'), which make
129 For purposes of my analysis, I draw no distinctions between a tying claim under § I of the
Sherman Act and one under § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.SC. § 14 (2000).
130 Microsoft I, 147 F.3d at 938.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 938-39.
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computers, install operating systems and other software that they have
licensed from vendors such as Microsoft, and sell the package to end users,"
which could "be either individual consumers or businesses."134
In 1993, Novell, a competitor of Microsoft in the supply of operating
systems for personal computers, filed a complaint with the European
Commission's competition authority, then known as Directorate General IV,
or DG IV. Novell argued that Microsoft was tying its MS-DOS operating
system to the Windows 3.11 graphical user interface.135 Before the launch of
Windows 95-which integrated the operating system with the graphical user
interface-Microsoft marketed the MS-DOS operating system separately
from the Windows graphical user interface. The Windows interface could
also be used with other DOS products. Nevertheless, Novell's complaint
centered on specific Microsoft marketing practices, such as per processor and
per system licenses, which, according to Novell, created economic incentives
for OEMs to preinstall MS-DOS and Windows 3.11.136 The complaint
maintained that these practices permitted Microsoft to exercise market power
over DOS-compatible graphical user interfaces to influence OEMs' choices
in the DOS market, in which Novell marketed a competing product, DR-
DOS.137
In 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice filed its own complaint against
Microsoft, claiming that the company's licensing agreements with OEMs
and other related practices were anticompetitive. The complaint was
accompanied by a proposed consent decree intended to regulate those
practices that had been negotiated between Microsoft, the Department, and
DG IV. That decree included § IV(E), characterized by both Microsoft and
the Department as an "anti-tying" provision:
Microsoft shall not enter into any License Agreement in which the
terms of that agreement are expressly or impliedly conditioned upon:
(i) the licensing of any other Covered Product, Operating System
Software product or other product (provided, however, that this
provision in and of itself shall not be construed to prohibit
Microsoft from developing integrated products); or
(ii) the OEM not licensing, purchasing, using or distributing any
non-Microsoft product.138
134 Id. at 939.
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After entry of the consent decree, Microsoft released its new browser,
Internet Explorer 3.0, when it unveiled Windows 95 in July 1995. All copies
of Windows 95 installed by OEMs included a version of Internet Explorer.
Except for the few months that an injunction was in force, OEMs were
required to install Internet Explorer as part of Windows. During the fall of
1997, OEMs had the option of installing Windows with either IE 3.0 or IE
4.0. Microsoft's contracts with OEMs generally require that they shift to the
latest service release of Windows shortly after it is publicly released.
Because of problems related to inventory in preparation for Christmas,
however, OEMs may wait until January or February before switching to new
releases issued in the fall. IE 4.0 was part of service release OSR 2.5, which
was ready in September 1997. Microsoft made available to OEMs a CD with
the patches needed to upgrade to IE 4.0/OSR 2.5. OEMs could install IE
4.0/OSR 2.5, or they could ship the CD with their systems for users to install.
If OEMs did not install IE 4.0/OSR 2.5, however, the version of Windows 95
that was installed still contained IE 3.0 (which was an integral part of
Windows).
In early 1998, the Department of Justice petitioned the U.S. District
Court in Washington, D.C. to hold Microsoft in civil contempt for its
bundled licensing of its Windows 95 operating system and IE 3.0, and to
enjoin Microsoft not to employ similar agreements with respect to any
version of IE in the future. The Department contended that Microsoft's
licensing practice violated § IV(E)(i) of the 1995 consent decree by
effectively conditioning the license for Windows 95 on the license for IE 4.0,
which, in the government's view, created a tie-in between the operating
system and the Web browser. The timing of the Department's petition may
have reflected an expectation that IE 4.0 would be the "killer" version of
Explorer (praised in industry reviews), which the government wanted to stop
before OEMs became contractually obligated to install IE 4.0 rather than IE
3.0. The district court granted the government's petition and issued a
preliminary injunction forbidding Microsoft from licensing Windows 95 or
any successor operating system on the express or implied condition that the
OEM also install Microsoft's Web browser.139
139 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1997). The injunction was am-
biguous, for it seemed to order as relief the very question at issue in the case. Apparently the parties were
equally confused and, after further negotiations, they stipulated that Microsoft would be in compliance
with the injunction "if it extended to OEMs the options of (1) running the Add/Remove Programs utility
with respect to IE 3.x and (2) removing the IE icon from the desktop and from the Programs list in the
Start menu and marking the file IEXPLORE.EXE 'hidden."' Microsoft H, 147 F.3d at 940-41. In fact,
browser functionality itself persists, and can be summoned up either by entering four lines of code or by
running any application (such as Quicken) that contains the code necessary to invoke the functionality.
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B. May the Interpretation of an Antitrust Consent Decree Compromise the
Goal of Consumer- Welfare Maximization That Is the Foundation of the
Antitrust Laws?
The rhetorical question that I pose as the caption for this section surely
must be answered in the negative. The D.C. Circuit cautioned at the outset
that its purpose was not to decide the antitrust issues that underlay the
government's original complaint against Microsoft, but rather to interpret the
bargain struck by the parties in their 1994 consent decree: "an antitrust
consent decree cannot be read as though its animating spirit were solely the
antitrust laws."140 That caveat, however, turns out to be more jurisdictional
than substantive in its import. It is clear that the D.C. Circuit did not
approach (for indeed it could not approach) the interpretation of this antitrust
consent decree as though the underlying goals and logic of antitrust law were
irrelevant to the interpretative task at hand. The goals and logic of antitrust
law were relevant because they defined the range of permissible
interpretations for a "contract" between Microsoft and the Department of
Justice that was to serve a public purpose.' 4' Indeed, it is worth asking
whether the acceptance by a federal district court of an interpretation of an
antitrust consent decree advanced by the Department of Justice that was
indifferent to consumer welfare would constitute a usurpation of legislative
According to the D.C. Circuit, "It appears not to be disputed that these alternate modes of compliance do
not remove the IE software code, which indeed continues to play a role in providing means of compliance
simply enable the OEMs to make user access to IE more difficult." 1d. at 941. The court found this puz-
zling, observing that, "by allowing OEMs to conceal IE, rather than to refuse it, the remedy fits poorly
with the Department's tying theory. A tie-in is not affected by the purchaser's ability to discard the tied
good." Id. at 941 n.3.
140 Microsoft 11, 147 F.3d at 946. The court, then quoted United States v. Armour & Co., 402
U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971), for the proposition that: "The decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose;
rather the parties have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant decree embodies as
much of those opposing purposes as the respective parties have the bargaining power and skill to
achieve." Id.
141 In an analogous manner, Justice Breyer reasoned in AT&TCorp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct.
721 (1999), that the mandatory unbundling provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996), though interpreted by the Federal Communications Commission under
a public interest standard rather than the consumer welfare standard of the antitrust laws, must be read
with the consumer welfare maximand of antitrust jurisprudence in mind, lest those statutory provisions
produce absurd results that would harm consumers and thus, necessarily, disserve the public interest. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 753-54 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); accord AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP 1999 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 114, 787; Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Con-
sumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J.
417 (1999). Congress stated that the purpose of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is to "promote competi-
tion and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommu-
nications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies." Tele-
communications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, preamble, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
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power (in effect, a selective repeal of the Sherman Act and its goal of
consumer-welfare maximization) by the executive and judicial branches, in
violation the principle of the separation of powers. 42
The precise question of whether Microsoft's integration of Windows 95
and Internet Explorer 4.0 violated the antitrust laws was not properly before
the court and therefore would have been beyond its jurisdiction, as an Article
III court, to decide. The case or controversy before the D.C. Circuit was not
whether Microsoft had violated the Sherman Act. 143 Nonetheless, it is
equally clear that, in interpreting what both parties to the consent decree
acknowledged to be an "anti-tying" provision that must be interpreted with
"procompetitive goals in mind,"144 the court's substantive legal and
economic reasoning was indistinguishable from the reasoning that it would
have applied in deciding what would constitute an unlawful tying
arrangement under then-current antitrust law. Although it is true that the
consent decree did not constitute an acknowledgment by Microsoft that any
of the prohibited practices were unlawful, or an acknowledgment by the
government that any of the permitted practices were lawful, the intent of both
parties nonetheless was necessarily informed-and necessarily constrained-
predominantly by antitrust law. Microsoft desired to compete as aggressively
as possible within the limits of the law, whereas the government sought to
restrain that competitiveness so that it remained within the same law.
Moreover, the parties could not have intended that their consent decree
would advance purposes that would frustrate the consumer welfare
maximization that is the objective of the antitrust laws. 145 A consent decree
manifesting such an intent would flunk the public interest test of the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, better known as the Tunney
Act, which establishes substantive and procedural standards for judicial
approval of a proposed consent decree.146
The D.C. Circuit began by noting that § IV(E)(i) of the consent decree
clearly must forbid a tie-in between Windows 3.11 and MS-DOS, the
practice about which Novell complained. At the same time, the decree
expressly recognized Windows 95 to be a single product that combined the
functionalities of a graphical interface and an operating system. "Thus if the
142 Cf Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Poli-
cies From Political Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295.
143 See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2 (case or controversy requirement).
144 Microsoft II, 147 F.3d at 946.
145 See, e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984); Ariz.
v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343
(1979); see also Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75
CAL. L. REV. 1005 (1987).
146 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b)-(h) (2000).
Yale Journal on Regulation
relation between Windows 95 and IE is similar to the relation between
Windows 3.11 and MS-DOS," the D.C. Circuit reasoned, "the link is
presumably barred by § IV(E)(i). On the other hand, . . .if the Windows
95/IE combination is like the MS-DOS/graphical interface combination that
comprises Windows 95 itself, then it must be permissible."147
The D.C. Circuit rejected the interpretations of both Microsoft and the
Department of Justice because neither party could propose a textual
interpretation of § IV(E)(i) that was consistent with the facts of the Novell
complaint that gave rise to the provision and the release of Windows 95,
which was expressly permitted under the decree. The Department argued
"that § IV(E)(i) prohibits Microsoft from bundling together a Covered
Product and anything that 'Microsoft simultaneously treats' and 'antitrust
law regards' as a 'distinct commercial product. "1 48 The Department further
relied upon Jefferson Parish "for the proposition that products are distinct for
tying purposes if consumer demand exists for each separately."149 According
to Judge Williams, however, "the Department's reading does not permit
Windows 95," whereas "Microsoft's reading would provide zero relief to
Novell, for it would allow Microsoft to bundle MS-DOS with Windows 3.11
as long as it did not license MS-DOS separately to OEMs."150 Each reading
had to be erroneous: "Neither can be the correct interpretation of a provision
that was intended to do both."''
In addition, the D.C. Circuit rejected the attempt by both Microsoft and
the Department to make Microsoft's own behavior with regard to the
packaging and marketing of its products the dispositive factor. The court
reached this conclusion by applying antitrust precedent and related economic
reasoning:
This would be no defect if the behavior were in some way relevant to the
economic principles of tie-ins. But it is not. The Department offers no
theory as to how a seller's abstaining from separate marketing of the tied
good might blunt the possible anticompetitive effects of bundling. It
seems especially beside the point where the goods are complements used
in fixed proportions. A monopolist who ties two such goods has no
obvious reason to market the tied good separately: since all buyers of the
tying good will also take the tied good, the residual market for the tied
good will be minimal. If the concern is that the tie-in makes it more
difficult for competitors to enter the market for the tying good (because
147 Microsoft II, 147 F.3d at 946.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 948.
151 Id.
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they must also offer the tied good), separate marketing of the tied good
actually mitigates the posited harm by facilitating new entry into the
market for the tying good. Thus both readings allow legitimation by
behavior that is either irrelevant or actively harmful.15 2
The D.C. Circuit further observed in a footnote that the hospital in Jefferson
Parish, a decision on which the government heavily relied, "surely did not
offer the tied good (anesthesia) separately from the tying good (surgery), but
this fact played no role in the Court's decision."153
C. Deriving the "Plausible Consumer Benefit" Rule from First Principles
of Antitrust Law
Frustrated by the inability of Microsoft and the Department of Justice to
produce textually consistent interpretations of § IV(E)(i), the D.C. Circuit
turned explicitly to antitrust law and related economic principles to resolve
the dilemma:
The Department and DG IV were concerned with the alleged
anticompetitive effects of tie-ins. Microsoft's goal was to preserve its
freedom to design products that consumers would like. Antitrust scholars
have long recognized the undesirability of having courts oversee product
design, and any dampening of technological innovation would be at
cross-purposes with antitrust law. Thus, a simple way to harmonize the
parties' desires is to read the integration proviso of § IV(E)(i) as
permitting any genuine technological integration, regardless of whether
elements of the integrated package are marketed separately.154
But what did the D.C. Circuit intend to use as its criteria in defining an
"integrated package"? To "give substantive content to the concept of
integration," the court defined an "integrated product" to be "most
reasonably understood as a product that combines functionalities (which may
also be marketed separately and operated together) in a way that offers
advantages unavailable if the functionalities are bought separately and
combined by the purchaser."155 Applying this definition to Novell's
complaint and the release of Windows 95, the D.C. Circuit explained that
Microsoft's product integration "suggests a degree of unity, something
152 Id. (citing Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, 858 F.2d 792, 795-96 (1st Cir. 1988)).
153 Id. at 948 n.10.
154 Id. at 948 (emphasis added).
155 Id.
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beyond merely placing disks in the same box."156 Because Windows 95
combined functionalities in a way that the purchaser could not, the D.C.
Circuit considered Windows 95 to be "an example of what Professor Areeda
calls 'physical or technological interlinkage that the customer cannot
perform. '"157
In addition, the D.C. Circuit stressed, the integrated product must also
be better in some respect from a consumer welfare standpoint. The D.C.
Circuit conceded that "[m]anufacturers can stick products together in ways
that purchasers cannot without the link serving any purpose but an
anticompetitive one." 58 The court emphasized that "[t]he concept of
integration should exclude a case where the manufacturer has done nothing
more than to metaphorically 'bolt' two products together, as would be true if
Windows 95 were artificially rigged to crash if IEXPLORE.EXE were
deleted."59 In its elaboration of the criteria for an integrated product, the
D.C. Circuit cautioned the district court-and, indeed, any court considering
tying issues-about the limited competence of courts generally to conduct
such an inquiry:
[W]e do not propose that in making this inquiry the court should embark on
product design assessment. In antitrust law, from which this whole
proceeding springs, the courts have recognized the limits of their
institutional competence and have on that ground rejected theories of
"technological tying." A court's evaluation of a claim of integration must
be narrow and deferential. As the Fifth Circuit put it, "[S]uch a violation
must be limited to those instances where the technological factor tying the
hardware to the software has been designed for the purpose of tying the
products, rather than to achieve some technologically beneficial result. Any
other conclusion would enmesh the courts in a technical inquiry into the
justifiability of product innovations."'] 60
156 Id. The Court emphasized that sham integration of products would fail antitrust scrutiny: "If
an OEM or end user ... could buy separate products and combine them himself to produce the 'integrated
product,' then the integration looks like a sham. If Microsoft had simply placed the disks for Windows
3.11 and MS-DOS in one package and covered it with a single license agreement, it would have offered
purchasers nothing they could not get by buying the separate products and combining them on their own."
Id.
157 Id. at 949 (quoting 10 AREEDA, ELHAUGE& HOVENKAMP, supra note 113, 1746b).
158 Id.
159 Id. (citing ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 448 F. Supp. 228, 233
(N.D. Cal. 1978) ("If IBM had simply bolted a disk pack or data module into a drive and sold the two
items as a unit for a single price, the 'aggregation' would clearly have been an illegal tying arrange-
ment."), aff'd per curiam sub noma. Memorex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.
1980).
160 Microsoft II, 147 F.3d 935, 949-50 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Response of Carolina, Inc. v.
Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1330 (5th Cir. 1976)).
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Moreover, the D.C. Circuit made clear that its interpretation of an "integrated
product" reflected not only the understanding of the parties to the consent
decree, but also that "this understanding is consistent with tying law."161 In
doing so, Judge Williams was careful to distinguish the issues relevant to
software integration and the "separate consumer demand" standard used by
the Supreme Court in Jefferson Parish and Eastman Kodak. The D.C. Circuit
noted that the Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak based its analysis of
separate consumer demand on efficiency considerations. The Justices
found parts and service separate products because sufficient consumer
demand existed to make separate provision efficient. But we doubt that it
would have subjected a self-repairing copier to the same analysis; i.e., the
separate markets for parts and service would not suggest that such an
innovation was really a tie-in .... Similarly, Professor Areeda argues that
new products integrating functionalities in a useful way should be
considered single products regardless of market structure.162
Although the D.C. Circuit reiterated that "the antitrust question is of course
distinct," and that "the consent decree does not bar a challenge under the
Sherman Act," the point made by Judge Williams for the D.C. Circuit-and
by Judge Wald in her separate opinion, for that matter163-about the doubtful
applicability of the Eastman Kodak rule of "separate consumer demand" to
technological tying cases still holds.
The D.C. Circuit concluded its discussion of the applicable legal rule by
emphasizing that its "analysis does not require a court to find that an
integrated product is superior to its stand-alone rivals."' 64 Judge Williams
161 Id. at 950.
162 Id. (citing Eastman Kodak v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992); 10 AREEDA,
ELHAUGE & HOvENKAMP, supra note 113, 1746b).
163 Judge Wald's separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, makes the same
point:
Under antitrust law, two products are considered distinct if there exists "sufficient con-
sumer demand so that it is efficient for a firm to provide [the first product] separately from [the
second]." The difficulty in this case is that technological evolution can change the boundaries
of what is "efficient." For example, Eastman Kodak cites cameras and film as examples of two
functionally linked products for which there exist separate markets. But antitrust law presuma-
bly would not bar the development of digital cameras, which do not require film in any con-
ventional sense.
Id. at 958 (Wald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462)
(citations omitted).
164 Microsoft 11, 147 F.3d at 950; see also ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs.
Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1978) ("Where there is a difference of opinion as to the advan-
tages of two alternatives which can both be defended from an engineering standpoint, the court will not
allow itself to be enmeshed 'in a technical inquiry into the justifiability of product innovations."') (quot-
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further stated that the court's interpretation of law did not read § IV(E)(i) to
"put[ ] judges and juries in the unwelcome position of designing computers,"
an admonition that the D.C. Circuit credited to Professor Areeda.165 "The
question," Judge Williams concluded, "is not whether the integration is a net
plus but merely whether there is a plausible claim that it brings some
advantage."166 Given the factual circumstances of the case, the D.C. Circuit
reiterated that it was not called upon to announce a general principle of
antitrust law: "Whether or not this is the appropriate test for antitrust law
generally, we believe it is the only sensible reading of § IV(E)(i)."67
Although the procedural posture of Microsoft II would have made it
inappropriate for the D.C. Circuit to announce that its standard applied to
antitrust law generally, it is hard to imagine why the court's reasoning should
deviate in any material respect from this approach in an antitrust case, given
Microsoft Irs grounding in antitrust principles and precedent. It is especially
difficult to see why the appropriate legal reasoning should be any different
for the tying and integrated product issues presented by the government's
1999 claims against Microsoft, given that the underlying factual and
economic issues are virtually identical. If Microsoft's bundling of Internet
Explorer 4.0 and Windows 95 was "consistent with tying law"168-and if that
product integration was equivalent for antitrust purposes to a self-repairing
copier or a digital camera, such that it was properly distinguished in
Microsoft II from the facts of Jefferson Parish and Eastman Kodak-then the
subsequent integration of Windows 98 and Internet Explorer 5.0 cannot
logically be treated any differently.
D. Application of the Product Integration Rule
Applying its product integration rule to the facts before it in Microsoft
II, the D.C. Circuit found that Microsoft "met the burden of ascribing facially
plausible benefits to its integrated design as compared to an operating system
combined with a stand-alone browser such as Netscape's Navigator."169 The
ing Leasco, 537 F.2d at 1330), aff'dper curiam sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 636
F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).
165 Microsoft 11, 147 F.3d at 950 (citing 9 AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1700j (1991)).
166 Id. at 950 (emphasis added).
167 Id.
168 Id. at 950. The majority in Microsoft II stated: "We believe this understanding [of 'inte-
grated products'] is consistent with tying law. The Court in Eastman Kodak... for example, found parts
and service separate products because sufficient consumer demand existed to make separate provision
efficient." Id. (citing 504 U.S. at 462; other citation omitted).
169 The D.C. Circuit explained:
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D.C. Circuit emphasized that even the government acknowledged that
consumers benefited from Microsoft's product integration: "Even the
Department apparently concedes that integration of functionality into the
operating system can bring benefits; responding to a comment on the
proposed 1994 consent decree (which the Department published in the
Federal Register as required by the Tunney Act), it stated that 'a broad
injunction against such behavior generally would not be consistent with the
public interest."'1 70 But on its own, the D.C. Circuit's finding of plausible
consumer benefits from Microsoft's product integration did not resolve the
issue.
The second part of the D.C. Circuit's rule asks whether there is some
reason that the two functionalities must be combined by Microsoft instead of
by its customers. This was not a simple question, the court emphasized, of
simply combining two CD-ROMs, though this possibility apparently was
considered highly significant by the government. If multiple disk
installations were equivalent to the customer's performing the combining of
products, then no "software product could ever count as integrated."171 The
D.C. Circuit rejected such logic in favor of the following:
[T]he only sensible answer is that the act of combination is the creation of
the design that knits the two together. OEMs cannot do this: if Microsoft
presented them with an operating system and a stand-alone browser
application, rather than with the interpenetrating design of Windows 95
and IE 4, the OEMs could not combine them in the way in which
Microsoft has integrated IE 4 into Windows 95. They could not, for
example, make the operating system use the browser's HTML reader to
provide a richer view of information on the computer's hard drive-not
without changing the code to create an integrated browser. This
reprogramming would be absurdly inefficient. Consequently, it seems
clear that there is a reason why the integration must take place at
Microsoft's level. 172
Incorporating browsing functionality into the operating system allows applications to
avail themselves of that functionality without starting up a separate browser application. Fur-
ther, components of IE 3.0 and even more IE 4-especially the HTML reader-provide system
services not directly related to Web browsing, enhancing the functionality of a wide variety of
applications. Finally, IE 4 technologies are used to upgrade some aspects of the operating sys-
tem unrelated to Web browsing. For example, they are used to let users customize their "Start"
menus, making favored applications more readily available. They also make possible "thumb-
nail" previews of files on the computer's hard drive, using the HTML reader to display a richer
view of the files' contents.
Id. at 950-51 (citation omitted).
170 Id. (quoting 59 Fed. Reg. 59,426, 59,428 (Nov. 17, 1994)).
171 Id.
172 Id. at 952 (citation omitted).
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This reasoning is consistent with the second step of the approach proposed in
Part IV,173 for the relative efficiency of the producer over the consumer as
the ultimate integrator of functionalities will depend on the nature of cost
subadditivity that results from the product integration. Again, it defies
explanation why the "only sensible answer" 74 to whether Windows 95 and
Internet Explorer 4.0 constitute an integrated product would not also apply in
a subsequent antitrust case not covered by the consent decree. Given the
technical interconnection of code cited by the D.C. Circuit and given the
consistency of Microsoft II with antitrust and economic principles, how can
the product be "integrated" for purposes of an anti-tying provision in a
consent decree and consistent with antitrust law, yet somehow remain
"disintegrated" for purposes of § I of the Sherman Act? Plainly, it cannot.
E. Judge Wald's Balancing Test
The majority in Microsoft II also warned against applying more
complex "balancing" approaches that would enmesh the court in technical
issues and judgments beyond its institutional competence. For example,
Judge Wald's separate opinion proposes that Microsoft be allowed to offer
an integrated product to OEMs under a single license "only if the integrated
product achieves synergies great enough to justify Microsoft's extension of
its monopoly to an otherwise distinct market."175 The majority observed,
however,
that a balancing test that requires courts to weigh the "synergies" of an
integrated product against the "evidence of distinct markets," is not
feasible in any predictable or useful way. Courts are ill equipped to
evaluate the benefits of high-tech product design, and even could they
place such an evaluation on one side of the balance, the strength of the
"evidence of distinct markets," proposed for the other side of the scale,
seems quite incommensurable. Both Jefferson Parish and Eastman Kodak
use their "distinct markets" analysis in a binary fashion: markets are
173 See supra Part IV.B.
174 Microsoft 11, 147 F.3d, 935, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (majority opinion).
175 Id. at 958 (Wald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). One lower court has embraced
Judge Wald's dissent in lieu of the majority opinion in Microsoft II. Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F.
Supp. 2d 1295, 1323 (D. Utah 1999). For a related criticism of the majority's opinion, see Einer Elhauge,
Microsoft Gets an Undeserved Break, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1998, at A17.
One might argue that courts in fact enmesh themselves in technical issues all the time, and that it is
a normal part of their function to weigh technical issues and make decisions. The mixed success of judi-
cial administration of antitrust decrees in technologically dynamic markets, however, suggests that skepti-
cism is justified. See generally SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 115, at 59; Shelanski & Sidak, supra note
47.
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distinct or they are not. If, as the record suggests, Microsoft proposed
modification of the integration proviso because of concern about "vague
or subjective criteria," an interpretation requiring courts to weigh
evidence that establishes distinctness (or does not) against a sliding scale
of net synergistic value looks like the most total transvaluation one can
imagine.176
My proposed approach is consistent with the majority's rejection of Judge
Wald's preferred rule in Microsoft 1H, for my third step would analyze the
likelihood that product integration would preserve monopoly in the tying
market, which, in the current generation of government cases against
Microsoft, is alleged to be the PC operating system. In other words, my third
step would place the burden on the plaintiff of establishing that the product
integration would preserve Microsoft's alleged monopoly over operating
systems; the focus would not be, as in Judge Wald's preferred approach, on
"extension of . . . monopoly to an otherwise distinct market."77 In this
respect, my approach is responsive, while Judge Wald's is not, to the
theoretical concerns about preservation of monopoly through product
integration. 178 My approach also is responsive, while Judge Wald's is not, to
Professor Lessig's related concern regarding the tying of partial substitutes
through software integration, which I will address in Part VI.
A further shortcoming of the balancing test proposed by Judge Wald is
that it overlooks an intrinsic fact about product integration. The D.C. Circuit
warned that it would be asked to make decisions that it had no institutional
competence to resolve:
By its very nature "integration" represents a change from a state of affairs
in which products were separate, to one in which they are no longer. By
focusing on the historical fact of separate provision, the separate opinion
puts a thumb on the scale and requires Microsoft to counterbalance with
evidence courts are not equipped to evaluate. We do not think that this
makes sense in terms of the text of the consent decree, the evidence of the
parties' intents, the values the decree was presumably intended to
promote, or the competence of the judiciary.179
There is no evident reason why these insights of the D.C. Circuit in
Microsoft I concerning the nature of product integration and a court's
176 Microsoft 11, 147 F.3d at 952-53 (citations omitted).
177 Id. at 958 (Wald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
178 See supra Part II.B.2.
179 Microsoft 11, 147 F.3d at 953. For further analysis of the limitations of a court's institutional
competence in such matters, see John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time: Micro-
soft and the Law and Economics of Exclusion, 7 SUp. CT. ECON. REV. 157 (1999).
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institutional competence in matters of software design would not apply
equally to a subsequent software tying case arising under § 1 of the Sherman
Act.
F. Summation
With its pronounced consumer-welfare orientation and reliance on
economic analysis, the D.C. Circuit's test in Microsoft II is consistent with
the approach that I proposed in Part IV for judging the lawfulness of
software integration as a matter of tying doctrine under § I of the Sherman
Act. Microsoft II supplies the intellectual foundation for formally extending
to software integration a more deferential antitrust rule for product
integration than the courts have traditionally applied to tying arrangements in
technologically mature markets. That refinement in antitrust theory is sound
and should be recognized as an insight of general applicability rather than as
the unique outcome of the interpretation of an isolated consent decree. To aid
in that recognition, I have shown that the Microsoft II fits comfortably within
the rule that I proposed in Part IV for antitrust scrutiny of software
integration.
V. Judge Jackson's 1999 Findings of Fact Concerning Microsoft's
Integration of Internet Explorer and Windows 98
On May 18, 1998, the Department of Justice and, separately, a group of
twenty states and the District of Columbia filed civil lawsuits against
Microsoft asserting multiple violations of federal antitrust laws.180 Judge
Jackson concluded that the cases were substantially similar and ordered them
consolidated.181 For brevity, and because of the fundamental similarity of the
two complaints, I will collectively call the plaintiffs "the Government." The
Government made numerous claims, under both §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act, that Microsoft purposefully engaged in a series of actions that were
180 Complaint, United States v. Microsoft Corp., (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 98-1232) [hereinafter DOJ
Microsoft Complaint]; Complaint, State of New York ex. rel. Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., (D.D.C. May 18,
1999) (No. 98-1233). The states and the District of Columbia also alleged violations of state antitrust
statutes. The states submitted a revised complaint on July 17, 1999. Complaint, State of New York ex. rel.
Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., (D.D.C. July 17, 1999) (No. 98-1233). The states participating in the July 17,
1999 complaint were: Califomia, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. On December 7, 1999, South Carolina
withdrew from the states' case.
181 United States v. Microsoft Corp., Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233, slip op. at 1-2 (filed D.D.C. May
22, 1998). In a subsequent order denying in the main Microsoft's motion for summary judgment, Judge
Jackson explained that "[t]he complaints allege essentially the same antitrust violations" and "seek virtu-
ally the same relief." United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1998-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,261 (D.D.C. 1998).
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designed to preserve a monopoly in the personal computer operating system
market and to extend that monopoly to the Internet browser market)82
On November 5, 1999, Judge Jackson issued lengthy findings of fact
that overwhelmingly accepted the Government's factual allegations against
Microsoft. Judge Jackson found that Intel-compatible PC operating systems
constituted a relevant market and that Microsoft held monopoly power in this
market.183 He also agreed with the bulk of the Government's contentions
regarding Microsoft's actions over the past decade. Most significantly for
assessing Microsoft's legal liability, he concluded that these actions "could
only have been advantageous if they operated to reinforce monopoly
power,"184 and that while they bestowed some benefits on consumers, in the
main these actions harmed consumers by inhibiting competition and
innovation in the computer industry. 85 Because of the expanse of Judge
Jackson's total findings of fact, I address here only those findings concerning
Microsoft's integration of Internet Explorer and Windows 98 that are
relevant to whether Microsoft engaged in unlawful tying in violation of § 1
of the Sherman Act.186
A. Middleware Threats to Microsoft's Operating System Monopoly
Judge Jackson concluded, consistently with the Government's
contentions, that beginning in the spring of 1995 Microsoft perceived the
emergence of cross-platform middleware, particularly Netscape's Navigator
browser, as a threat to its monopoly power.1 87 Judge Jackson found that
Microsoft had also identified other cross-platform middleware technologies
as threats, namely IBM's Notes software, Apple's Quicktime software,
RealNetworks' multimedia playback technologies, and Intel's Native Signal
Processing software.88 Judge Jackson asserted, however, that Navigator
182 DOJ Microsoft Complaint, supra note 180, 7 1-38, 53-123; State Microsoft Complaint, su-
pra note 180, 9-78; Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Conclusions of Law at 1-2, 2-54, 66-70, United States v.
Microsoft Corp. (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Proposed Conclusions of
Law].
183 Findings of Fact 7 18-66, United States v. Microsoft Corp. (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. 98-1232,
98-1233) [hereinafter Microsoft Findings of Fact].
184 Id. 67.
185 Id. 7 408-12.
186 For a summary of Judge Jackson's findings of fact on other antitrust claims, see Shelanski &
Sidak, supra note 47.
187 Microsoft Findings of Fact 77 68-77. Judge Jackson noted that Microsoft recognized Java as
a threat to its monopoly power in the spring of 1996. Id. T 75.
188 Id. 78. Judge Jackson observed that Intel's Native Signal Processing software, while in-
tended to operate cross-platform, was not a form of middleware because it was designed to interact with a
PC's microprocessor "independently of the operating system." Id. 78, 97. Nevertheless, Judge Jackson
concluded that Microsoft feared this technology for the same reasons that it feared other forms of cross-
platform middleware. Id. TT 78, 94-103.
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figured most prominently in Microsoft's concerns because it was well-
positioned to serve as a platform for "network-centric applications that run in
association with Web pages."189
Judge Jackson explained that Microsoft feared these technologies
because they could run on multiple operating systems (hence the
denomination "cross-platform") and because they exposed their own APIs on
which software developers could rely in lieu of the APIs exposed in the
underlying operating system. Microsoft recognized, Judge Jackson
concluded, that if middleware programs became widely used-and
simultaneously exposed sufficient numbers of APIs to support the advanced,
full-featured applications that run on Windows-then large numbers of
software developers would have sufficient incentive to write applications that
relied entirely on middleware APIs, and developers and consumers alike
would no longer be reliant on Windows as an applications platform. In this
manner middleware could, according to Judge Jackson, "dissipate" the
positive feedback loop that supports the "applications barrier to entry,"
thereby erode that barrier, and, in the parlance of Microsoft's worst fears,
turn Windows into a commodity.190
Judge Jackson concluded, consistently with both the Government's
contentions and his decision to exclude middleware from the relevant
market, that the threat to Microsoft's operating system monopoly posed by
middleware technologies was not imminent because these technologies
exposed significantly fewer APIs than Windows did, and thus such
middleware could not support the full-featured applications that Windows
supported. Navigator and Java combined exposed fewer than a thousand
APIs while Windows exposed nearly ten thousand.191 Microsoft nevertheless
feared these technologies because of the potential threat that they posed. 192
B. Microsoft's Response to the Browser Threat
Based on the evidence at trial, Judge Jackson concluded that Microsoft
first sought to contain the threat posed by Navigator by seeking Netscape's
agreement, in mid-1995, to divide the browser market.193 Netscape refused
Microsoft's proposal, and thereafter Microsoft delayed the provision of





193 Id. 79-83. Judge Jackson observed that, at the time of Microsoft's proposal, Navigator
was the only browser that enjoyed enough market share to have the potential to erode the applications
barrier to entry. Id. 89.
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from releasing the Windows 95 version of its browser until after Microsoft's
retail release of Windows 95 and Internet Explorer.194
In Judge Jackson's view, Microsoft recognized that, if Navigator
emerged "as the standard software employed to browse the Web," then large
numbers of developers would write software applications that ran on its APIs
and Navigator could thereby erode the applications barrier to entry. 95
Accordingly, after Netscape refused Microsoft's proposal, Microsoft sought
to prevent Navigator from becoming the standard by maximizing Internet
Explorer's market share at "Navigator's expense."196 Microsoft
accomplished this goal in part by competing on quality and price.
Specifically, from 1995 forward, Microsoft spent more than $100 million
annually to improve the quality of Internet Explorer to the point where
industry reviewers were split over whether Internet Explorer or Navigator
was the superior product.'97 Microsoft also spent $30 million annually
promoting Internet Explorer. Judge Jackson further found that Microsoft
bundled Internet Explorer with Windows 95 and later technically integrated
Internet Explorer with Windows 98 and offered Internet Explorer for free.
Judge Jackson found that Microsoft did this despite its large investment in
Internet Explorer and the potential to obtain significant revenues from its
sale. Judge Jackson conceded that Microsoft might have given Internet
Explorer away for free to respond to competition rather than to preserve the
applications barrier to entry. He concluded, however, that Microsoft's
determination to preserve that barrier "was the main force driving its
decision to price the product at zero."198
Judge Jackson determined that, because Navigator's then-existing
market penetration had been far ahead of Explorer's, Microsoft had not
believed that competition alone would succeed in diverting "enough browser
usage from Navigator to neutralize it as a platform."199 Judge Jackson
concluded that Microsoft foreclosed the OEM distribution channel to
Navigator by prohibiting OEMs from removing Internet Explorer from
Windows or from altering or customizing the Windows boot-up sequence.
He found that Microsoft enforced these prohibitions, which some large
OEMs protested, by leveraging its power in the operating system market and
including within its Windows licensing contracts provisions that allowed it to
withhold Windows licenses from OEMs that failed to comply.200 Judge
194 Id. 90-92.




200 Id. TT 155, 158-66, 203,205-30, 239-41.
Yale Journal on Regulation
Jackson found that Microsoft reasoned correctly that the restriction against
removing Internet Explorer would deter OEMs from loading Navigator onto
their PCs because to do so would increase support costs and consumer
confusion, to the point where OEMs' profits on the sale of a computer would
be depressed.201 In support of his conclusion regarding foreclosure, Judge
Jackson noted that by January 1998, only four of sixty OEM sub-channels
shipped Navigator with their PCs, and these four did not necessarily place its
icon on the desktop, the manner in which customers were most likely to use
it.202 Judge Jackson further determined that the restriction against altering the
boot-up sequence served to prevent OEMs from (1) featuring Navigator on
the Windows desktop more prominently than Internet Explorer, (2) making
their PCs more user-friendly, and (3) differentiating their PCs from those
sold by their competitors.03
Judge Jackson concluded that browsers and operating systems are two
separate products because consumers seek to purchase them separately and
because there is general agreement within the software industry that the
functionalities that these two products provide are distinct.204 In support of
his conclusion, Judge Jackson observed that some consumers do not want
browsers with their operating systems, and that corporate consumers using
multiple operating systems may seek to purchase a browser independently of
the operating system to ensure the maintenance of uniform browser software
across different operating system platforms used within the companies.205
Noting Microsoft's argument that other vendors bundle browsers with their
operating system, Judge Jackson concluded that Microsoft was the only
vendor that did not give OEMs and consumers the choice either not to install
the browser or to uninstall it.206 Given the Government's demonstration at
trial that Internet Explorer could be removed without harming the
functionality of Windows, Judge Jackson concluded that no technical reason
existed for Microsoft to prohibit consumers from removing Internet Explorer
from Windows.207
Judge Jackson was not persuaded by Microsoft's arguments regarding
the technical virtues of combining Internet Explorer and Windows. He
concluded that Microsoft integrated browsing-specific routines with
operating system routines "to a greater degree than is necessary to provide
201 See id.9 159.
202 Id. T 239.
203 Id. % 205-30, 241.
204 Id. 9 150-54.
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any consumer benefit,"208 and that Microsoft thereby "unjustifiably
jeopardized the stability and security of the operating system,"209 not only for
consumers who wanted a browser, but also for consumers who did not. He
further found that the integration of Internet Explorer and Windows reduced
the speed of a PC, a disadvantage for consumers who did not want a
browser.210 Finally, Judge Jackson concluded that Microsoft integrated
Internet Explorer into Windows not for any procompetitive purpose, but
purely to restrict Navigator's distribution and to stop "Navigator from
weakening the applications barrier to entry."211
In judging the impact on the market shares of Internet Explorer and
Navigator of Microsoft's restrictions on OEMs, Judge Jackson concluded
that Microsoft had significantly increased Internet Explorer's share of the
browser market and significantly decreased Navigator's share. Judge Jackson
concluded that Navigator's share had decreased from around 70 percent in
the beginning of 1996 to around 50 percent in mid-1998, while Internet
Explorer's share had increased from around 5 percent to 50 percent by mid-
1998. He found that some of the increase in Microsoft's market share was
due to its improvements in its product and its decision to give it away for free
but, nevertheless, concluded that Microsoft's share would not have increased
as much as it did if it had "not devoted its monopoly power and monopoly
profits to precisely that end."212
In assessing Microsoft's intent, Judge Jackson concluded that while
Microsoft might have given Internet Explorer away for free to consumers
and expended millions of dollars in developing and promoting Internet
Explorer to respond to competition, Microsoft would not have sacrificed the
millions of dollars in revenues that it could have obtained by charging other
vendors for Internet Explorer and by charging for spots on the Windows
desktop,213 and spent the millions of dollars that it did in securing for Internet
Explorer the most efficient distribution channels, unless Microsoft perceived
"browser usage share as the key to preserving the applications barrier to
entry." 214 Judge Jackson concluded that Microsoft's actions were profitable
only to the extent that they preserved the applications barrier to entry. 21 5 He
found that Microsoft did not act to maximize the ancillary revenues it could
have derived from the sale of Internet Explorer. Even if Microsoft had acted
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in this regard, however, Judge Jackson found that the "ancillary revenue...
realized would not come close to recouping the cost of its campaign to
maximize Internet Explorer's usage share at Navigator's expense."216
In Part VII, I will examine the strengths and weaknesses of using
Professor Lessig's proposed software integration rule to determine, on the
basis of Judge Jackson's findings of fact, whether Microsoft engaged in
unlawful tying of Internet Explorer and Windows 98.
VI. Professor Lessig's Proposed Software Integration Rule
In the 1999 trial of United States v. Microsoft Corporation, the
Government argued that Microsoft II was the incorrect standard to apply to
Microsoft's integration of Internet Explorer and Windows 98. Professor
Franklin Fisher criticized Microsoft II in his direct testimony for the
Government: "If combining two products in a way that produces plausible
efficiencies (however slight), or that makes it difficult to separate the
products, were an absolute defense to a claim that the combination was anti-
competitive, software commerce would be essentially immune from tying
scrutiny."217 Professor Fisher believed that "the anti-competitive effects are
large" and "the technological benefits appear to be small or non-existent."21s
He reiterated that concern in February 2000, stating that if Microsoft II "were
to be extended to antitrust law generally, it would provide an open invitation
for firms to cloak exclusionary acts in minor innovations. '" 21 9 Instead,
Professor Fisher argued, Microsoft should be required to offer consumers
and OEMs the option to purchase the Internet Explorer Web browser and the
Windows 98 operating system separately. By failing to give consumers this
alternative, he claimed, Microsoft's actions "had an immediate harmful
effect on consumers, . . . who faced a limited browser choice . . . [and an]
unnecessarily cumbersome operating system."220 Nonetheless, Professor
Fisher did seem to acknowledge that plausible consumer benefits from the
integration of software will be commonly observed. He conceded that
"[v]irtually every product design, particularly in the area of computer
216 Id. 142.
217 Fisher Direct Testimony, supra note 42, 158. Strictly speaking, Professor Fisher is not
necessarily at odds with Microsoft 11 because the quoted language from his trial testimony is not an accu-
rate summary of the D.C. Circuit's product integration rule. The D.C. Circuit's test asks not only whether
plausible consumer benefits flow from the product integration, but also whether consumers are themselves
capable of performing the integration of functionalities. See supra Part V.D. By characterizing the rule of
Microsoft II as "an absolute defense" to claims of anticompetitive integration of software, Professor
Fisher was knocking down a straw man.
218 Fisher Direct Testimony, supra note 42, 158.
219 Fisher & Rubinfeld, supra note 43, at 51.
220 Id. at 23.
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software, can make a plausible claim for some efficiency or benefit,"221
particularly when software products are combined to share code. 222
Given this direct attack by the Government on the applicability of
Microsoft II to the facts of the 1999 monopolization trial of Microsoft, Judge
Jackson requested Professor Lawrence Lessig to submit an amicus curiae
post-trial brief addressing the question of "how the law of tying applies to an
alleged tie of software products."223 Professor Lessig's brief is especially
important to evaluate. As Part VIII will explain, Judge Jackson wrote his
findings of law on the tying issue in a way that ensured a collision with the
D.C. Circuit's decision in Microsoft II. Afterward, Judge Jackson
commented fatalistically in public that "virtually everything" he did in the
case "may be vulnerable on appeal" and suggested that he would recuse
himself from the case if it were remanded by a higher court.224 Thus, as the
case moved to the Court of Appeals for oral argument in early 2001, it
became more plausible that the tying rule ultimately applied in the Microsoft
case would not be the one that Judge Jackson had used. One alternative rule
is Professor Lessig's, which Judge Jackson cited approvingly in dicta, as I
shall discuss in Part VIII.225
Professor Lessig agreed with most commentators and lower courts that
the Supreme Court's tying test in Jefferson Parish is ill-suited for the special
facts related to computer software.226 That point of departure is, of course,
also consistent with the rule that I proposed in Part IV. The differences
between the products and services at issue in Jefferson Parish and Eastman
Kodak on the one hand and computer software on the other, and the perverse
results that could arise from an uncritical application of the "consumer
demand" test to software, lead Professor Lessig to conclude that "the law in
this area is unsettled."227 Again, I agree. Beyond that point, however, I
believe that Professor Lessig's rule would have serious shortcomings if it
were applied as it now stands because it lacks the kind of economic
clarification that I have proposed for a tying rule in Part IV.
221 Id. at 26.
222 Id.
223 Lessig Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at I.
224 Trial Judge Comments on Microsoft Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2000, at 14C; Microsoft
Judge Says He May Step Down From Case On Appeal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2000, at B4.
225 Microsoft Findings of Law, supra note 5, at 51 n.6.
226 Lessig Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 1.
227 Id.
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A. Professor Lessig's Application of Microsoft II and Jefferson Parish to
the 1999 Findings of Fact in the Microsoft Case
Professor Lessig's brief acknowledged that Judge Jackson could well
view the analytical framework articulated by the Court of Appeals in
Microsoft II as the controlling standard "in spirit if not in form."228 Judge
Jackson himself had made clear that, although the D.C. Circuit's decision
"was ostensibly limited to interpreting the specific terms of the Consent
Decree, the analysis was, in the Court of Appeals' eyes, 'consistent with
tying law."229 If Microsoft II controls, Professor Lessig plainly stated, then
Internet Explorer and Windows 98 are a single product.2 30
Professor Lessig next considered the outcome if Jefferson Parish's
separate demand test is applied without modification to software products. If
the existence of separate markets for operating systems and browsers is the
only relevant criterion, as Professor Lessig believed it would be under
Jefferson Parish, then Windows 98 and Internet Explorer are separate
products even in their integrated form.231 Professor Lessig expressly agreed
with Microsoft, however, that Jefferson Parish's separate demand test is not
only inadequate for evaluating software tying claims, but also potentially
harmful to consumers:
The concern is over-inclusiveness-that the "separate demand" test in the
context of software will condemn far too many bundles, especially if the
rule is a "per se" rule. As Microsoft argues, the evolution of software is a
constant process of bundling new functionality into old products. As the
government acknowledged in the 1994 Tunney Act proceedings, often
this bundling involves adding functionality to an operating system that
results in the lessening of demand for some software product .... Yet the
"separate demand" test places a constant pressure on this bundling. 232
The Areeda antitrust treatise-now edited by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp
following Professor Areeda's death-also agrees that the separate demand
test is both inadequate and potentially harmful: "It bears ... emphasis that
tying law's 'separate product' requirement was not developed with a product
such as computer software in mind."233 Moreover, if the separate demand
228 Id. at 12.
229 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1998-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 72,261 (D.D.C. 1998) (order
denying summary judgment) (quoting Microsoft II, 147 F.3d at 950 n. 14).
230 Lessig Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 1, 12-17.
231 Id. at 23-24.
232 Id. at 24 (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 59,426, 59,428 (1994)).
233 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP 1999 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 114, 1746.1d (quoted in Lessig
Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 24).
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standard is to be the only test, then "virtually all improvements to software
would have to be regarded as separate products."234 This concern, Professor
Lessig observed, has led Professor Hovenkamp to propose in the 1999
supplement to the Areeda treatise a new test, specifically intended for
software products and written to avoid overinclusiveness, that closely
resembles the D.C. Circuit's test in Microsoft II:
[A] single product conclusion seems to be the correct one in all cases in
which the code for the two programs is interspersed such that the
purchaser cannot readily separate them. The disadvantage of such a rule
is that any software producer can comply with it by interspersing code.
But the disadvantage of an alternative rule forcing separation is that most
of the advantages of integration will have been lost.235
Because of his concern that there exists a substantial risk that competition
and innovation could be stifled rather than fostered by traditional tying tests,
Professor Lessig urged Judge Jackson to extend the analysis of Jefferson
Parish so that the separate demand test, as it applies to software, weeds out
only those bundles that are truly anticompetitive.36
B. Professor Lessig's Proposed Rule
Rather than embrace the rule of Microsoft II or of the 1999 Areeda
supplement, Professor Lessig proposed his own standard based partly on the
1996 Areeda treatise framework for analyzing tying claims and partly on the
facts of the 1999 Microsoft trial. Unlike the 1999 Areeda supplement rule or
Microsoft II, Professor Lessig focuses on the combining of functionalities
rather than the interspersing of code. He argues that code can be used better
than other technologies to hide strategic bundling, and that any legal test
should be neutral between contract-based and code-based restrictions on
bundling. He intends by his approach to ensure that
[i]f there are two software products that could be combined to operate
together "in a new way," then so long as there is no risk of strategic
bundling, the law should allow the innovator to decide how the two
product are more efficiently combined. The aim of any antitrust inquiry
should be whether the particular bundle is a strategic bundle, aiming at
234 Id. 1746.1 (quoted in Lessig Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 24).
235 Id. 1746.1b.
236 Lessig Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 22-26, 32.
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anticompetitive ends, not whether the bundle achieves its interlinkage
through contract or software. 237
In identifying whether two separate products have been combined, moreover,
the court would consider the nature of the underlying products in terms of
functionality rather than as lines of code. A software item should be treated
as a separate product if the software functionality is "separately valued by
consumers." 238 Applying these criteria, Professor Lessig argues that browser
functionality currently is considered a separate product by consumers, but
that Microsoft's consolidation of its browser with its operating system should
be treated presumptively as a single product under antitrust tying law,
"unless an independent reason exists why this type of bundle raises special
anticompetitive concerns."239
One such anticompetitive concern in Professor Lessig's schema that
could rebut the single-product presumption is if the two functionalities are
partial substitutes for one another. If the products are partial substitutes for
one another, and if the software vendor combining them has market power in
the tying product, then, reasons Professor Lessig, their integration could
prohibit the tied product from becoming a competitive substitute for the tying
product and thereby engender a specific competitive harm.240 Professor
Lessig thus addresses the theoretical concerns that software integration could
preserve monopoly power over the tying product (operating system
software). In Professor Lessig's view, Internet browsers are partial
substitutes for the Windows 98 operating system; he therefore argues that the
presumption that the Internet Explorer Web browser and the Windows 98
operating system are a single product could be rebutted.241 At the same time,
however, Professor Lessig argues that an Internet browser bundled with an
operating system could nonetheless be treated as a single product under tying
law if the software is configured so as to give consumers an option to refuse
the partial substitute.242 Thus, even if a Web browser is a partial substitute
for the Windows 98 operating system, Professor Lessig still treats the
package as a single product if Internet Explorer can be easily removed by the
customer without disabling the operating system.
Professor Lessig seems most concerned not that Microsoft has
combined a Web browser with Windows 98, but that the most recent version
of Windows 98 had integrated them so that one will not run without the
237 Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
238 Id. at 20.
239 Id. at 40.
240 Id. at 40 (citing 10 AREEDA, ELHAUGE & HOVENKAMP, supra note 113, 1747).
241 Id. at 40-42, 43.
242 Id. at 42.
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other.243 He emphasizes that many of Microsoft's competitors bundle their
operating systems with browsers, that this is standard industry practice, and
that there is nothing anticompetitive about it.244 Indeed, he acknowledges,
combining the two functionalities offers many benefits.245 The salient
difference for Professor Lessig is that these competitors have not required
consumers to take the bundle, and in fact they simultaneously offer their
operating systems for sale either without a browser or in a manner that
permits the consumer to remove the browser.246
C. The Limitations of Professor Lessig's Rule
Although helpful and constructive in many ways, Professor Lessig's
proposed rule for software integration has a number of serious shortcomings.
These shortcoming make Professor Lessig's rule less appropriate for courts
to adopt than the rule of Microsoft II, as refined by the analysis that I set
forth in Part IV.
1. Integrated Functionalities and Strategic Code Writing
First, Professor Lessig's focus on a software product's "functionalities"
is potentially more misleading than the "strategic" code writing that he seeks
to discourage. What may appear to one person to be strategic code writing
will appear to another to be superior efficiency. The integration of
functionalities through shared code is, by definition, an economy of scope.
Code sharing among the Internet Explorer Web browser and the Windows 98
operating system can economize on development costs, not only for
Microsoft, but also for other firms that produce applications software that
runs on the Windows platform. This savings in development costs arises
because the applications software need not duplicate certain lines of code.
Such elimination of duplicative code also economizes on the use of disk
space on the consumer's hard drive. Although some may regard that savings
in information storage as insignificant today, it need not be in the future, as
applications software continues to proliferate. For these reasons, code
sharing embodies cost subadditivity.247
243 Seeid. at41-42.
244 Id. at 30-31,42.
245 Id. at 3.
246 Id. at 30, 42 (citing Innovation Data Processing v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 585 F. Supp.
1470, 1476 (D.N.J. 1984)).
247 Business and computer industry publications praised the integration features of Windows 98,
although those assessments do not necessarily refer specifically to cost of development or size of code
benefits. See, e.g., Stephen H. Wildstrom, Why I'm Rooting for Microsoft, BuS. WK., Feb. 23, 1998, at 30
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Moreover, the "functionality" to which Professor Lessig refers is really
Web browsing only, whereas Internet Explorer in fact provides other
functions that support both the operating systems and the applications. That
is why in Windows 98 it is not possible to disable totally and remove Internet
Explorer without also disabling Windows.
It therefore is more complex than Professor Lessig suggests to define
exactly what is meant by a "functionality" without reference to the
underlying system architecture. It would therefore be likely that courts
seeking to define the relevant "functionalities" of a given software package
under Professor Lessig's proposed rule would be drawn into the detailed
inquiries about product design that the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft II regarded
itself as lacking the institutional competence to undertake.
2. The Tied Product as a Partial Substitute for the Tying Product
A second difficulty with Professor Lessig's analysis is his view that it is
necessarily anticompetitive for software products that are partial substitutes
to be combined and that this factor is enough to overcome the presumption
that an integrated product should not be treated as two separate products
under anti-tying law. At the outset, one must ask whether or not Professor
Lessig intends to use the economic concept of a substitute in a technical
economic sense. Regardless of whether he does or does not, problems arise
with his analysis, though for different reasons.
a. Taking Partial Substitutes Seriously
Let us assume that Professor Lessig intends to present an argument
grounded in economic theory. What, then, is a "partial" substitute, how does
it differ from a "total" substitute, and how would one measure the
difference? Professor Lessig's explication of his model of partial substitutes
answers none of these questions and, to the best of my knowledge, the
concept of a "partial substitute" is not defined in any of the major texts on
microeconomic theory or industrial organization. 248 The discussion of partial
("[Tihe incorporation of browsing and other Internet function into Windows is a powerful innovation. It
may be very inconvenient for Microsoft's competitors, but it's a big gain for consumers, who should be
allowed to enjoy those benefits.").
248 A definition of "partial substitutes" cannot be found in any of the following leading texts on
microeconomic theory or industrial organization: WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND
OPERATIONS ANALYSIS (3d ed. 1972); DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (2d ed. 1994); HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); JAMES A. HENDERSON & RICHARD E. QUANDT,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH (3d ed. 1980); MICHAEL D. INTRILLIGATOR,
MATHEMATICAL OPTIMIZATION AND ECONOMIC THEORY (1971); DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN
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substitutes in Professor Hovenkamp's supplement to the Areeda treatise
(from which Professor Lessig draws his own analysis) is not any more
rigorous in economic terms.249
In price theory, any good X has complements and substitutes. A
complement is a good Y whose demand increases as the price of good X falls.
Economists quantify the complementarity between goods X and Y through
the cross-price elasticity of demand for Y with respect to X. If the demand for
Y increases as the price of X falls, then the cross-price elasticity of demand
for Y with respect to X is a negative number and Y is a complement of X.250
Conversely, a substitute is a good Z whose demand increases as the
price of good X rises. Again, the cross-price elasticity of demand is price
theory's standard metric. If the demand for Z increases as the price of Xrises,
then the cross-price elasticity of demand for Z with respect to X is a positive
number and Z is a substitute ofX.251
What might it mean for a good to be a "partial" substitute of another
good? Can the tied good "partly" substitute for the tying good and,
simultaneously, "partly" serve as a complement to it? Might the cross-price
elasticity of demand sometimes be positive and sometimes be negative?252
The subtleties of complementarity and substitution have fascinated the minds
of Nobel laureates. In 1947, for example, Professor Paul Samuelson wrote:
"There is no reason why two distinct definitions [of complementarity] should
give the same answer in any particular case, so it is not surprising that one
can invent examples ad infinitum for which two goods, such as wheat and
linen, are on one of the definitions complements and on the other
substitutes."253 Surely, it is too intellectually sloppy for a court to outlaw
MICROECONOMIC THEORY (1990); LOUIS PHLIPS, APPLIED CONSUMPTION ANALYSIS (1974); ROBERT S.
PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS (2d ed. 1992); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (3d ed. 1990); GEORGE J. STIGLER,
THE THEORY OF PRICE (4th ed. 1987); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988);
VARIAN, supra note 10.
249 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP 1999 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 114, 1746.1d.
250 E.g., KREPS, supra note 248, at 61.
251 Id.
252 Depending on whether or not compensating variations in income keep the consumer on the
same indifference curve, "it is possible for a pair of goods to be substitutes in terms of [the cross-price
substitution effect], and at the same time to be gross complements." HENDERSON & QUANDT, supra note
248, at 32. This outcome would be a quirk of the income effect, which is sometimes omitted when
economists loosely speak of substitutes and complements. E.g., BAUMOL, supra note 248, at 363. One
cannot determine from Professor Lessig's brief, or from the authorities which he cites, whether his theory
of partial substitutes bears any relationship to the formal theory of gross substitutes and gross comple-
ments, such as it is presented in the standard microeconomics text of Professors Henderson and Quandt.
253 PAUL A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 185 (1947). Following the
terminology of Sir John Hicks, Professor Samuelson uses the term independent goods to describe a pair of
products, "such as beef and textbooks, for which a price change for one good has no effect on the demand
for the other." PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 81 (15th ed. 1995); see also
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certain practices concerning the integration of software used by millions of
consumers on the basis of imprecise and empirically unsubstantiated
conjectures about the cross-price elasticity of demand of Internet Explorer
with respect to Windows 98.
Perhaps Professor Lessig envisions that the total cross-price elasticity of
demand for Internet Explorer with respect to Windows 98 can be
decomposed into two "partial" components of demand. The first would be
the summation of consumer demand for which Internet Explorer (or a non-
Microsoft Web browser) is a complement to Windows 98. The second would
be the summation of demand among the remaining set of consumers for
whom Internet Explorer (or a non-Microsoft Web browser) is a substitute for
Windows 98. In such a functional specification of demand, one would need
to sum the complementarity and substitution effects to evaluate whether, on
balance, Internet Explorer is a net complement to or a net substitute for
Windows 98.
Such an exercise would, of course, require empirical estimates of the
cross-price elasticity of demand (by customer segment). It is not sufficient to
say that, for some customers, the demand for Navigator would rise with an
increase in the price of Windows 98, and vice versa. 254 A cross-price
elasticity of 0.05 would not support the same inferences about the consumer
welfare effects of allegedly anticompetitive software integration as would a
cross-price elasticity of 1.00. Which magnitude is closer to the true cross-
price elasticity of non-Microsoft Web browsers with respect to Windows 98
(assuming for the sake of argument that the sign on the elasticity is positive)?
Professor Lessig's approach avoids this empirical question entirely by
implicitly treating cross-price elasticity as a binary variable (two goods either
are substitutes or they are not) rather than as the continuous variable that it
is. By so doing, Professor Lessig's approach omits many analytical steps that
would be necessary before a court could reliably conclude that non-
Microsoft Web browsers and the Windows 98 operating system were
sufficiently cross-price elastic that harm to consumer welfare could result
from Microsoft's integration of Internet Explorer and Windows 98.
Of course, neither Professor Lessig nor any of the government's
witnesses in the Microsoft trial endeavored to estimate such demand
relationships empirically. At a minimum, therefore, one must say that the
PHLIPS, supra note 248, at 78 (discussing JOHN R. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL (1936)). It is not clear
how independent goods fit into Professor Lessig's theory of partial substitutes, if at all.
254 Moreover, it is not the case that the cross-price elasticity of demand of X with respect to Y is
equal to the cross-price elasticity of Y with respect to X This caveat is especially important for antitrust
policy in technologically dynamic industries. See Jerry A. Hausman, J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer,
Residential Demand for Broadband Telecommunications: Implications of Cable Mergers for Consumer
Access to Unajfiliated Internet Content Providers, 18 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2001).
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conjecture that the combining of "partial substitutes" constitutes an
anticompetitive form of product integration is an inherently factual
proposition which, to be taken seriously, would require the government to
submit econometric evidence of the consumer demand for both the Windows
98 operating system and the Web browsers that supposedly provide the basis
for creating rival applications platforms. The record of the Microsoft trial
provided no basis for making economically informed judgments on this
question.
b. Partial Substitutes as a Metaphor
I regard the notion of partial substitutes to be useless unless it can be
expressed with some modicum of economic rigor that would ensure
neutrality and predictability in the application of the concept. Some might
respond, however, that the problem is mine-that I am misreading Professor
Lessig. The argument would be the following: Professor Lessig is not using
partial substitute in a technical economic sense at all. The Microsoft case all
along has concerned the notion that the browser has certain aspects that are
complementary to the operating system (as any application has) and other
aspects that are potential substitutes, such that the browser could migrate into
being a platform itself. As a descriptive matter, everyone would agree that
the browser could replace (that is, "substitute for") Windows. If one replaces
that wordy explanation with the short-hand expression "partial substitute,"
no one familiar with the facts of the Microsoft case would disagree. In that
sense, Professor Lessig's invocation of partial substitutes has nothing to do
with cross-price elasticities.
Even with this alternative reading of Professor Lessig, there are at least
two problems that severely limit the usefulness of partial substitutes as a
label or metaphor to be used in antitrust law. First, the Microsoft case is by
any standard a case of extraordinary factual complexity. Few persons, even
including the appellate judges who will decide the case, can be expected to
steep themselves in all of the case's institutional detail. If the concept of
partial substitutes is employed to decide the case, that concept will acquire a
life of its own, wholly divorced from the intimate factual understanding of
those directly involved in the Microsoft litigation. That is so because of the
importance of the Microsoft case, because of the substantial reputation of the
scholar proposing this nomenclature, and because the malleability of the
concept of partial substitute-if it is not constrained by precise economic
reasoning-will invite other litigants in other cases to give the concept a
meaning that suits their immediate purposes. One need only examine the
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growth in reported claims of violation of the essential facilities doctrine to be
reminded how much case law a catchy slogan can generate. 255
A second, perhaps more substantive, difficulty that arises when "partial
substitute" is employed at the level of label or metaphor is that it obscures
the idea that antitrust law should, as Professors Daniel Kessler and William
Baxter argue, 256 treat conduct or agreements concerning complements
differently from conduct or agreements concerning substitutes. Automobiles
are complements to airlines for traveling between downtown London and
downtown Paris, by way of Heathrow and De Gaulle Airports. But one might
say automobiles are also partial substitutes for airlines for the intercity
portion of that journey, because the Channel Tunnel permits an automobile
to travel by railroad flatcar underneath the English Channel. For however
long browsers remain complements to Windows, antitrust law should give
greater deference to conduct or agreements that integrate the two
functionalities. When, because of technological change or changes in
consumer tastes, browsers have become substitutes for Windows, antitrust
law should give lesser deference to such product integration. To speak
ambiguously of "partial" substitutes is to truncate or eliminate entirely the
earlier period of antitrust deference that should appropriately be given to
product integration among complements.
3. Substitutability and Market Definition: Intel-compatible PC
Operating Systems versus Applications Platforms
A third problem with Professor Lessig's notion of partial substitutes
(and, indeed, with his approach generally) is that it calls into question the
logic of defining the relevant market, for purposes of evaluating Microsoft's
market power, as the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems. To
say that Web browsers can substitute for Windows 98 in the sense that they
make possible the establishment of rival applications platforms is to say that
the relevant product market should be defined to encompass all applications
platforms, not simply Intel-compatible PC operating systems. Under such a
market definition, however, all inferences about Microsoft's market power
would have been attenuated. In a sense, therefore, Professor Lessig's theory
of partial substitutes is an example of having one's cake and eating it too:
The government can assert a narrowly prescribed relevant product market
255 Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1187
(1999); Philip E. Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet In Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST
L.J. 841 (1990).
256 William F. Baxter & Daniel P. Kessler, Toward a Consistent Theory ofthe Welfare Analysis
ofAgreements, 47 STAN. L. REv. 615 (1995).
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and then argue that, as a matter of tying doctrine, the tied product is a
thwarted substitute for the tying product, which has been found to embody
market power because of the restrictive market definition that excludes the
possibility of competition from the tied product.
4. Real Options and the Oddity of Disabling as an Antidote to Tying
Fourth, Professor Lessig's analysis has an arbitrary quality that is
characteristic of legal fictions. The integration of partial substitutes is suspect
in his schema, such that he deems them separate products for purposes of
tying doctrine. Yet, if the consumer can disable the tied software, then
Professor Lessig excuses the integration. Expiation flows from the disabling
of shared code: If the consumer can, at low cost, negate the cost
subadditivities of software integration, then two separate products in
Professor Lessig's schema will nonetheless be treated, for purposes of
imposing liability under accepted tying doctrine, as a lawfully integrated
product.
He admits: "It might seem odd to conceive of a tie as constituted by the
failure to permit the removal of software product."257 Professor Lessig is
correct. It is odd. Two plus disabling equals one. Professor Lessig tries to
make tying law's traditional examination of separate products perform an
analytical task for which it is ill-suited and uninformative. As noted earlier,
the D.C. Circuit refused to do such a thing, stating in Microsoft II that "[a]
tie-in is not affected by the purchaser's ability to discard the tied good."258
The fact that both Internet Explorer and Navigator are given away for
free, that no OEM or consumer is in any way "forced" to purchase Internet
Explorer, and that any OEM or consumer can easily install Navigator if
desired also reveals the limitations of Professor Lessig's focus on
removability as a remedy for the "partial substitute" phenomenon that he
describes. Professor Lessig argues that if Internet Explorer can be easily
removed, then no consumer is "forced" to take it.259 In contrast, he argues,
"[t]he relevant forcing [in the PC software market] is the refusal to allow the
consumer the option to decline the offer."260 But how is it ever meaningful to
say that a consumer has been "forced" to receive for free an extra,
convenient feature in a product? Even the consumer who prefers another
browser is free at all times to take or leave Internet Explorer, just as the
sports fan who subscribes to the Sunday New York Times is free to keep or
257 Lessig Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 30.
258 Microsoft I1, 147 F.3d 935, 941 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also supra note 139.
259 Lessig Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 40-42.
260 Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
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discard the New York Times Review of Books. If the consumer likes Internet
Explorer, she uses it; if she prefers Netscape, she simply downloads it from
software on the Internet or instructs Dell to install it on her new computer.
None of those courses of action is difficult as a practical matter.
Microsoft's product integration gives the consumer a real option in the
precise economic sense of the term and a real option plainly confers
considerable value to its holder, as is widely understood in the theory of
finance.261 Any real option subsumes within it what Professor Lessig calls
"the option to decline the offer." Perhaps Professor Lessig believes that it is
important that a consumer have the prerogative to refuse to receive the offer
of a free option. As a matter of economic theory, however, while holding
income constant, a consumer's utility cannot be increased by reducing from
n to n - 1 the number of goods that she may consume. Moreover, the cost to
the consumer of holding that option is essentially zero because, as Professor
Lessig stresses, the capacity of the consumer's hard drive is vast.262 It is hard
to see that there is any infringement of consumer sovereignty here, let alone
one that rises to an antitrust concern. The opacity of Professor Lessig's
economic reasoning violates his own warning against turning tying law into
"questions of metaphysics."263
5. The Revelation of Consumer Demand: Professor Lessig's Price
Theory or Professor Knight's?
Implicit in Professor Lessig's discussion of product integration is an
assumption that consumers tell producers how much integration of software
is optimal. More generally, one might ask whether it is consumers or
producers who decide, in the first instance, which goods producers shall
supply. Professor Lessig presumes that consumers make such decisions, and
that their evident preference is for less rather than more product integration.
In his brief, Professor Lessig asserts: "If it is the purpose of tying doctrine to
preserve consumer choice, it would make most sense to view a 'product' as
the consumer would."264 From this uncontroversial premise, however,
Professor Lessig takes a leap of economic theory, for which he relies on
261 For discussions of real options to use assets that embody sunk costs, see AVINASH K. DIXIT
& ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1994); Hausman & Sidak, supra note 141,
at 462-64; and Jerry Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in Telecommunications,
1997 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1.
262 Lessig Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 30-31 ("When a computer is sold, its hard disk is an
underutilized shipping container. To the extent it is empty, it represents software that could have been
offered to consumers.").
263 Id. at 19.
264 Id. at 20.
Vol. 18:1, 2001
An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration
Judge Jackson's findings of fact: "Consumers determine their software
requirements by identifying the functionalities they desire."265
There is, however, a strong argument about the revelation of consumer
demand that Professor Lessig never considers. In 1921, Professor Frank
Knight, the great University of Chicago price theorist, argued that producers
are better able than consumers to anticipate future consumer preferences. He
posed the problem of revelation of consumer preferences as follows: "The
essence of organized economic activity is the production by certain persons
of goods which will be used to satisfy the wants of other persons. The first
question which arises then is, which of these groups in any particular case,
producers or consumers, shall do the foreseeing as to the future wants to be
satisfied."266 Knight did not believe that consumers specify their preferences
clearly to producers. Rather, he reasoned: "At first sight it would appear that
the consumer should be in a better position to anticipate his own wants than
the producer to anticipate them for him, but we notice at once that this is not
what takes place. The primary phase of economic organization is the
production of goods for a general market, not upon direct order of the
consumer. "267
When one considers this insight by Professor Knight in the context of a
tying rule for software integration, it becomes increasingly clear that it would
be injurious to consumer welfare for a court to condemn the integration of
"partial substitutes" unless, as Professor Lessig advocates, the producer
allowed consumers to disaggregate the product. To require the producer to
do so would thwart the producer's role as the party who facilitates the
revelation of consumer preferences. It is reasonable to expect that the
importance of this revelation of preferences increases with the extent of
technological dynamism in a particular product market. In this respect, the
"character of demand" analysis in Jefferson Parish is uninformative when
consumers face products for which they have newfound and uncertain
demand.
For example, well into the early 1990s, consumers seeking access to the
Internet had to install their own software and invest the time to learn how to
use it. Web browsing was not yet commonplace. Yet Netscape and Microsoft
anticipated the future consumer demand for Internet usage and electronic
commerce. Working with OEMs, they offered consumers the convenience of
an integrated product consisting of a PC with applications programs and the
capability to browse the Internet. The revelation of consumer preferences is a
265 Id. (quoting Microsoft Findings of Fact, supra note 183, 149).
266 FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 240 (1921).
267 Id.
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genuine innovation or discovery, one whose value courts and antitrust
officials can belittle or ignore only at great peril to consumer welfare.
6. The Comparative Inefficiency of Consumer Bundling of Software
As noted earlier in the discussion of subadditive costs in Part IV.C, it is
doubtful that the consumer is a lower-cost integrator of software
functionalities than the software manufacturer. Professor Lessig evidently
disagrees: "With software products, whether two items will operate better
when bundled by the defendant than when bundled by the customer is simply
a matter of software design. If there is a difference in the functionality of the
resulting bundle if installed by the consumer, this is because the designer
chose to make it that way."268 This assessment is misguided in at least two
respects.
First, it overlooks that when the consumer performs the software
integration, it becomes less clear who is to blame if the software application
does not perform as intended. If the consumer has not attempted to integrate
the software functionalities himself, he has one less potential source of the
failure. Only someone who has never had his computer crash would
minimize the significance of this consideration. As noted in Part II.A, courts
have accommodated this quality-control concern in the law on tie-ins. It
would be curious to give that concern so little weight in the context of
software integration as Professor Lessig's rule suggests.
Second, Professor Lessig ignores the cost of the labor supplied by the
consumer to effect the integration. Professor Lessig believes that fitting cars
with bumpers and transmissions is harder than integrating software
functionalities, in part because "installing [bumpers and transmissions]
properly requires training."269 And installing software does not? Professor
Lessig may be more facile with software than automobiles, but many
consumers dislike loading and configuring software onto their personal
computers because they regard the task as confusing, time-consuming,
poorly documented, or frustrating. Such consumers, unlike the computer
enthusiast, do not derive any consumption value from the integration
process. Large law firms typically do not ask their associates to load and
maintain their own software on their computers. There is a more productive
use of associates' time, and other employees have a comparative advantage
268 Lessig Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 35 (emphasis added).
269 Id. The other reason that Professor Lessig offers for why consumers can more easily inte-
grate software than physical products is cryptic indeed: "bumpers and transmissions are heavy and large
objects to handle-not because the manufacturer has made them that way, but because nature has made
them that way." Id. (emphasis added).
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in computer maintenance. The rebuttal might be: Continue to require
consumer integration, and expect specialized third-party integrators to
emerge. But there would still be nontrivial transactions costs. Even when
consumer integration does not require specialized knowledge, it may
nonetheless be an inefficient use of the consumer's labor. In England
appliances are sold without the plug already attached to the end of the
electrical cord; the consumer then goes to an electrical store to buy the
proper plug given the wiring in his residence. Many Americans would find it
bizarre if they were expected to "integrate" the vacuum cleaner and the plug.
They value convenience. An hour spend loading one's own software is an
hour not spent reading Proust or watching the World Wrestling Federation.
7. Preordaining the Answer: Equating the Separateness of Products
with an Anticompetitive Effect of Integration
Professor Lessig's proposed approach starts with a presumption that two
software products bundled together are an integrated product, unless the two
functionalities combined have an anticompetitive effect.270 If, in other words,
it is a bundle of the kind of products likely to cause an anticompetitive harm,
then the presumption finding a 'single product' would be rebutted.271 The
fallacy of this reasoning is that it asks an economic question to decide a legal
fiction: If anticompetitive effects flow from product integration, then two
products are indeed two products; but if no anticompetitive effects flow from
product integration, then two products are really only one product. Such
logic is untenable.
As shown above, Professor Lessig's notion of partial substitute as a
proxy for such an effect suffers from the same defects for which Professor
Lessig criticizes Jefferson Parish and the separate demand standard. What,
then, is the true "anticompetitive" effect? If the consumer welfare test
remains the ultimate standard for the measurement of harm, how has the
consumer been harmed? How can providing her with Web-browsing
capability for free and a vastly improved and more efficient operating system
be said to have harmed her? Even if the consumer prefers another Web
browser, what prevents her from using it? Certainly not the added cost of
receiving Internet Explorer, for that is zero.
270 Id. at41.
271 Id.
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8. Does the Lawfulness of Product Integration under Professor
Lessig's Rule Ultimately Collapse into an Analysis of Predation?
Professor Lessig argues that "[t]he aim of any antitrust inquiry should
be whether the particular bundle is a strategic bundle, aiming at
anticompetitive ends, not whether the bundle achieves it [sic] interlinkage
through contract or software."272 He would permit a firm to integrate
software in a new form, either through contract or through the interspersing
of code, "so long as there is no risk of strategic bundling."73 Zero tolerance,
however, is a very demanding standard. If Professor Lessig intends to
propose an antitrust rule that tolerates no risk of strategic bundling, it is
incumbent upon him to define the concept more specifically than to say
simply that a "strategic" bundle is one "aiming at anticompetitive ends."
Every firm has a "strategic" purpose in selecting particular product
designs, pricing structures, marketing efforts, and the like. One way to
interpret "strategic" is to regard it as the adjective that describes the informed
actions of firms that are forced to respond to competitive threats. An
efficacious competitive strategy will naturally cause the firms against which
it is directed to characterize the strategy as "anticompetitive." Another way
to interpret "strategic" is to equate it with "predatory." In Microsoft's case,
one can ask whether its integration of Internet Explorer into Windows 98
was a legitimate competitive response to the threat that other companies
would create middleware alternatives to the Windows application platform,
or whether such integration was an anticompetitive act. To discriminate
between the two hypotheses, Professor Lessig suggests that "strategic" code
writing is the cost that must be weighed against the putative consumer
benefits of software integration. If, however, the ultimate determination of
whether particular code is "strategically" written turns on its profitability in
the absence of other firms' exiting the market, then the tying rule that
Professor Lessig advocates requires, as its final step, a determination that
would resemble an entire predatory pricing inquiry.
9. The Limits of Complex Legal Rules
A final, overarching weakness of Professor Lessig's approach is the
implausibility that it could coherently guide behavior in the real world. "As a
matter of judicial policy," he posits, "it is a mistake to fetishize code," and
thus he is "not a skeptic of courts' ability to understand how software
272 Id. at 39.
273 Id. (emphasis added).
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functions."274 More specifically, he asserts that "courts and commentators
have little trouble understanding the difference between a description of 'two
products' going into a tying inquiry, and the conclusion that these two
products are a 'single product' for purposes of antitrust tying law."75 This
belief is problematic on two levels.
First, Professor Lessig is writing a rule for the wrong audience.
Ultimately, the question when designing a legal rule is not what "courts and
commentators" can or cannot understand. To be sure, in the legal academy
there are large payoffs to displaying how elegantly one can manipulate
symbols, concepts, and language in the formulation of legal rules. So
Professor Lessig may not consider it the least bit pedantic to say that "[t]he
'separate product' or 'single product' designation is the conclusion of a legal
analysis, not an instance of ordinary language."76 But for most people, law
is not art, and judicial decisions are not grist for literary criticism. Ordinary
language matters. If they truly care about increasing economic welfare,
courts in antitrust cases should resist the kind of solipsism in legal
scholarship that produces rules that can be understood only by cognoscenti
who have removed themselves from the gritty world of commerce. An
antitrust rule for software integration ultimately will influence the
competitive strategies of real companies with real managers who must decide
how to invest billions of their shareholders' dollars to develop real products
that real consumers will value. Rather than focus on "courts and
commentators," the more useful question to ask is, Would a particular
antitrust rule for software integration be comprehensible to a classroom of
MBA or computer science students intending careers in technologically
dynamic industries? If not, the rule is worthless, or worse. After all, who do
we expect to be running software companies in the next decade-antitrust
lawyers?
Second, even if we do limit our focus to whether "courts and
commentators" can articulate and apply complex antitrust rules for software
integration, Professor Lessig's own brief is, if anything, evidence that courts
and commentators cannot. Professor Lessig argues that even so experienced
a jurist as Judge Stephen Williams (himself a former professor) produces a
"mistaken" application of the Areeda treatise's proposed rule on software
274 Id. at2.
275 Id. at 22.
276 Id. Professor Lessig later states: "To say that two 'software products' have been bundled into
the same software package is not yet to conclude that they should be considered 'two products' for pur-
poses of antitrust tying law." Id. Perhaps legal scholars and jurists regard this as a subtle distinction, but
they should not be surprised if men and women of commerce regard it as gibberish.
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integration in Microsoft 11.277 Professor Lessig also notes that the author of
the annual supplement to that treatise, Professor Hovenkamp, changed his
opinion from one year to the next on whether it was correct for the D.C.
Circuit to find in Microsoft II that Windows 95 and Internet Explorer were an
integrated product. 278 If Judge Williams and Professor Hovenkamp err and
vacillate this much over the analysis of software integration in Microsoft 11,
one must wonder how lesser lights can be expected to fare with the
responsibilities that Professor Lessig's rule would impose. And finally, if
complex rules for software integration are really so easy for courts to follow,
why did Judge Jackson need Professor Lessig to write an amicus brief on the
subject in the first place?
D. Summation
Professor Lessig proposes that two software items bundled together by
code or by contract be presumptively treated as a single product absent an
anticompetitive effect. That proposal has promise. But showing such an
anticompetitive effect must turn upon actual evidence of harm to consumers,
not on whether the new, integrated product made life more difficult for the
firm's competitors, an entirely predictable and desirable consequence. 279
277 "While the Court relied in its opinion upon the analysis of the Areeda Treatise, its rule is
actually more forgiving than the rule announced in the treatise." Id. at 13. "So, again, if one interprets the
Court's opinion as applying antitrust law generally, then its interpretation of the Areeda Treatise at least
was mistaken." Id. at 14 n.12.
278 Id. at 32 ("While the Court of Appeals, using the [new product] rationale [of the Areeda
treatise test for whether integrated products are a single product for tying purposes], concluded the text
meant that Windows 95 and IE were likely 'integrated,' the 1998 edition of the treatise, applying the same
test, agreed with this [federal district] Court that they should likely be considered 'separate products,' and
the 1999 edition of the treatise, applying the same test again, agreed with the Court of Appeals, though for
different reasons, that they should be considered 'integrated."') (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION,
1746b (Supp. 1998), in comparison with AREEDA & HOVENKAMP 1999 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 114,
1746.1b).
279 For a discussion of the difference between consumer welfare and competitor welfare ap-
proaches to antitrust and regulatory policy, see Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 47; and Hausman & Sidak,
supra note 141, at 452-53. Justice (then Judge) Breyer has described the difference as follows: "'Anticom-
petitive' [in antitrust law] also has a special meaning: it refers not to actions that merely injure individual
competitors, but rather to actions that harm the competitive process, a process that aims to bring consum-
ers the benefits of lower prices, better products, and more efficient production methods." Interface Group,
Inc. v. Mass. Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9, 10 (1st Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). Similarly, Chief Judge Posner
has written for the Seventh Circuit: "[Tihough there is a sense in which the exclusion of any competitor
reduces competition, it is not the sense of competition that is relevant to antitrust law. The policy of com-
petition is designed for the ultimate benefit of consumers rather than of individual competitors, and a
consumer has no interest in the preservation of a fixed number of competitors greater than the number
required to assure his being able to buy at the competitive price." Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic
Surgeons, 706 F.2d 1488, 1497 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Univ. Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Unimarc Ltd., 699
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Moreover, the purpose of conducting economic analysis of the competitive
effects of a particular instance of software integration should not be to
contrive an answer to the question of whether one or two products are
present. Unfortunately, Professor Lessig's rule suffers from its willingness to
perpetuate the legal fictions of tying doctrine.
His rule suffers as well from its failure to answer satisfactorily a number
of economic questions that are critical to consumer welfare: When is code
"strategic"? What is the precise meaning of a "partial substitute," and how
does that meaning square with the restrictive market definition used by the
district court in the Microsoft case? By what alchemy can the disabling of
software turn two products into one? How can a consumer suffer any
coercion when given a free option to use a software product? What is the
comparative advantage of producers over consumers in anticipating
consumer demand for software functionalities and, later, integrating those
functionalities? What happens if the antitrust rule for software integration is
so complex as to be unintelligible to the very economic actors whose
behavior the rule is intended to influence? Without better answers to such
questions, Professor Lessig's rule cannot assure us that it would enhance
rather than diminish consumer welfare.280
VII. Judge Jackson's Software Integration Rule
On April 3, 2000, Judge Jackson issued conclusions of law in the
Government's antitrust trial against Microsoft, which held that Microsoft had
violated the antitrust laws on multiple grounds.281 On the question of the
integration of Internet Explorer and Windows 98, the judge explicitly
rejected the analysis of Microsoft II. In that respect, Judge Jackson produced
a legal rule on software integration that, in contrast to my proposed
refinement of the Microsoft II analysis in Part IV, threatens consumer
welfare in technologically dynamic markets.
F.2d 846, 853 (7th Cir. 1983); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984);
Product Liab. Ins. Agency v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d 660, 663-65 (7th Cir. 1982).
280 The preliminary empirical evidence suggests that antitrust enforcement efforts against Mi-
crosoft have caused net losses in economic welfare. George Bittlingmayer & Thomas W. Hazlett, DOS
Kapital: Has Antitrust Action Against Microsoft Created Value in the Computer Industry?, 55 J. FIN.
ECON. 329 (2000).
281 Microsoft Findings of Law, supra note 5, at 35-57.
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A. Judge Jackson's Deference to Microsoft II in His 1998 Summary
Judgment Motion
Earlier in the Microsoft case, Judge Jackson appeared to acknowledge
that Microsoft II was the controlling legal authority on the question of
whether Windows 98 and Internet Explorer are separate products for
purposes of tying doctrine under § 1 of the Sherman Act. When ruling on
Microsoft's motion for summary judgment in 1998, Judge Jackson said that,
although Microsoft II "was ostensibly limited to interpreting the specific
terms of the Consent Decree, the analysis was, in the Court of Appeals' eyes,
'consistent with tying law.' 282 He observed that Microsoft II "articulate[d] a
framework for determining whether an integration amounts to a single
product for purposes of evaluating a tying claim."283 In his April 2000
findings of law, however, Judge Jackson repudiated that legal conclusion.
B. Judge Jackson's 2000 Findings of Law
In his April 2000 findings of law, Judge Jackson concluded, among
other things, that "Microsoft . . . violated § 1 of the Sherman Act by
unlawfully tying its Web browser to its operating system."284 Judge Jackson
agreed with the Government that "Microsoft's combination of Windows and
Internet Explorer by contractual and technological artifices constitute
unlawful tying to the extent that those actions forced Microsoft's customers
and consumers to take Internet Explorer as a condition of obtaining
Windows."285 In reaching that conclusion, Judge Jackson ruled that the
applicable precedent for evaluating Microsoft's product bundling was not the
D.C. Circuit's 1998 decision in Microsoft II, but rather the Supreme Court's
decisions in Eastman Kodak and Jefferson Parish, neither of which
specifically concerned product integration in the computer software
industry.286 Judge Jackson stated: "The fact that Microsoft ostensibly priced
Internet Explorer at zero does not detract from the conclusion that consumers
were forced to pay, one way or another, for the browser along with
Windows."287
Judge Jackson began his discussion of tying under § 1 of the Sherman
Act by reciting the blackletter, four-part test for an unlawful tie-in, which he
282 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1998-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 72,261 (D.D.C. 1998) (order
denying summary judgment) (quoting Microsoft II, 147 F.3d at 950).
283 Id.
284 Microsoft Findings of Law, supra note 5, at 35.
285 Id. at 47.
286 Id. at 47-51.
287 Id. at 50.
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noted had been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak and
Jefferson Parish.288 He summarized his conclusion that Microsoft had, "by
contractual and technological artifices," created an unlawful tie-in by
requiring customers "to take Internet Explorer as a condition of obtaining
Windows."289 He then immediately conceded that his conclusion of law was
"arguably at variance with a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit in a closely related case, and must therefore be explained in
some detail."290
C. The Rejection of Microsoft II in Favor of Jefferson Parish and Eastman
Kodak
Judge Jackson wrote that, "upon reflection this Court does not believe
the D.C. Circuit intended Microsoft II to state a controlling rule of law for
purposes of this case,"291 and he considered the applicability of Microsoft II
to be circumscribed accordingly. Any hint by the D.C. Circuit that its
reasoning applied generally to the antitrust law of tie-ins was, in Judge
Jackson's view, "in the strictest sense obiter dicta" and "not formally
binding."292 In a tone that nearly mocked the appellate court, Judge Jackson
hastened to add that "both prudence and the deference this Court owes to
pronouncements of its own Circuit oblige that it follow in the direction it is
pointed until the trailfalters."293
In Judge Jackson's view, the D.C. Circuit's trail immediately faltered.
From the outset of his discussion of the applicable antitrust standard for the
integration of software, Judge Jackson took so skeptical a view of the D.C.
Circuit's "undemanding" rule in Microsoft II as to say that it contradicted the
Supreme Court's precedent on point: "The majority opinion in Microsoft II
evinces both an extraordinary degree of respect for changes (including
'integration') instigated by designers of technological products, such as
software, in the name of product 'improvement,' and a corresponding lack of
confidence in the ability of the courts to distinguish between improvements
in fact and improvements in name only, made for anticompetitive
purposes." 294 Echoing Professor Fisher's testimony, Judge Jackson said:
"Read literally, the D.C. Circuit's opinion appears to immunize any product
288 Id. at 47.
289 Id.




293 Id. (emphasis added).
294 Id. at 47 (quoting Microsoft II, 147 F.3d at 950).
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design (or, at least, software product design) from antitrust scrutiny,
irrespective of its effect upon competition, if the software developer can
postulate any 'plausible claim' of advantage to its arrangement of code."295
Then, in the most judicially audacious sentence of his findings of law, Judge
Jackson said that the D.C. Circuit had misread Jefferson Parish and Eastman
Kodak:
This undemanding test appears to this Court to be inconsistent with the
pertinent Supreme Court precedents in at least three respects. First, it
views the market from the defendant's perspective, or, more precisely, as
the defendant would like to have the market viewed. Second, it ignores
reality: The claim of advantage need only be plausible; it need not be
proved. Third, it dispenses with any balancing of the hypothetical
advantages against any anticompetitive effects. 296
Judge Jackson considered Microsoft II to conflict fundamentally with the
Supreme Court's separate-demand analysis in Jefferson Parish and Eastman
Kodak.297
In both Jefferson Parish and Eastman Kodak, Judge Jackson observed,
the defendants argued that the allegedly tied and tying products "were in
reality only a single product, or that every item was traded in a single
market."298 As noted in Part IV, the allegedly tied and tying products were, in
Jefferson Parish, hospital services and anesthesiology services 299 and, in
Eastman Kodak, replacement parts for Kodak photocopying and
micrographic equipment and repair services for such equipment.300 This
single-product argument, Judge Jackson reasoned, was analogous to
Microsoft's argument that "that Windows and Internet Explorer represent a
single 'integrated product,' and that the relevant market is a unitary market
of 'platforms for software applications.'-301 Judge Jackson emphasized that,
in Jefferson Parish, the Supreme Court concluded "that the 'character of the
demand' for the constituent components, not their functional relationship,
determined whether separate 'products' were actually involved"302 and, in
295 Id.
296 Id. at 47-48.
297 Id. at 48.
298 Id.
299 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,21-24,28-29 (1984).
300 Eastman Kodak Co. Image Tech. Serv., 504 U.S. 451, 463 (1992).
301 Microsoft Findings of Law, supra note 5, at 48 n.3 (quoting Microsoft's Proposed Conclu-
sions of Law).
302 Id. at 48 (quoting Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19).
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Eastman Kodak, that such a determination requires "evidence of 'actual
market realities.' 303
Judge Jackson was also skeptical of a business-justification defense to
tying, a skepticism that he attributed to the Supreme Court's decisions in
Jefferson Parish and Eastman Kodak. The Court, he observed, had
considered claims that the tying arrangement had achieved productive
efficiency ("scheduling, supply, performance standards, and equipment
maintenance") in Jefferson Parish and had advanced "quality control,
inventory management, and the prevention of free riding" in Eastman
Kodak.304 Judge Jackson emphasized that the Court did not find such
"justifications sufficient if anticompetitive effects were proved."305 That
proposition, however, is a non sequitur, for a defendant need not present an
affirmative defense to a tying claim if the plaintiff cannot show any
anticompetitive effect. A business-justification defense that is applicable
only when the elements of an unlawful tie-in have not been proven is no
defense at all. This aspect of Judge Jackson's reading of Jefferson Parish and
Eastman Kodak proves too much.
On the basis of his interpretation of the single-product and business-
justification aspects of Jefferson Parish and Eastman Kodak, Judge Jackson
boldly concluded that a superior court was wrong on the law-that "at a
minimum, the admonition of the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft II to refrain from
any product design assessment as to whether the 'integration' of Windows
and Internet Explorer is a 'net plus,' deferring to Microsoft's 'plausible
claim' that it is of 'some advantage' to consumers, is at odds with the
Supreme Court's own approach."306 Judge Jackson said that Jefferson Parish
and Eastman Kodak establish "that resolution of product and market
definitional problems must depend upon proof of commercial reality, as
opposed to what might appear to be reasonable."307 He concluded that these
two Supreme Court cases obligated a court to ascertain "product and market
definitions . . . by reference to evidence of consumers' perception of the
nature of the products and the markets for them, rather than to abstract or
metaphysical assumptions as to the configuration of the 'product' and the
'market. "308
303 Id. (quoting Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 466-67 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
384 U.S. 563, 572 (1966))).
304 Id. (citing Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483).
305 Id. (citing Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483-86; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 25 n.42).
306 Id. at 49 (quoting Microsoft II without citation).
307 Id.
308 Id. (citing Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 18; Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481-82).
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D. The Application of Jefferson Parish and Eastman Kodak to the 1999
Findings of Fact in the Government's Microsoft Case
Having reasoned that Microsoft II was bad law and not applicable as a
general matter of antitrust law to the government's 1998 complaint that
Microsoft unlawfully tied its Internet Explorer Web browser to the Windows
98 operating system, Judge Jackson proceeded to analyze the four elements
of an unlawful tie-in under § 1 of the Sherman Act in light of his reading of
Jefferson Parish and Eastman Kodak and his 1999 findings of fact. Two of
his legal findings are noteworthy. On the question of whether Internet
Explorer and Windows 98 were separate products, he concluded that "the
commercial reality is that consumers today perceive operating systems and
browsers as separate 'products,' for which there is separate demand."309 In
Judge Jackson's estimation, this separateness of demand existed
"notwithstanding the fact that the software code supplying their discrete
functionalities can be commingled in virtually infinite combinations,
rendering each indistinguishable from the whole in terms of files of code or
any other taxonomy."310
Second, with respect to the final element of an unlawful tie-in, Judge
Jackson found that Microsoft's sale of Windows 98 was conditioned on its
sale of Internet Explorer:
Microsoft refused to license Windows 98 to OEMs unless they also
agreed to abstain from removing the icons for Internet Explorer from the
desktop. Consumers were also effectively compelled to purchase Internet
Explorer along with Windows 98 by Microsoft's decision to stop
including Internet Explorer on the list of programs subject to the
Add/Remove function and by its decision not to respect their selection of
another browser as their default.3 11
The fact that Microsoft did not pursue a classic strategy of price-
discrimination through metering was of no moment to Judge Jackson. He
wrote: "The fact that Microsoft ostensibly priced Internet Explorer at zero
does not detract from the conclusion that consumers were forced to pay, one
way or another, for the browser along with Windows."312 Judge Jackson
stated that "the purpose of the Supreme Court's 'forcing' inquiry is to expose
309 Id. at 49 (citing Microsoft Findings of Fact, supra note 183, 149-54, 162-63, 187-91).
310 Id.
311 Id. at 50 (citing Microsoft Findings of Fact, supra note 183, 213, 170-72).
312 Id. at 50. "Despite Microsoft's assertion that the Internet Explorer technologies are not 'pur-
chased' since they are included in a single royalty price paid by OEMs for Windows 98, it is nevertheless
clear that licensees, including consumers, are forced to take, and pay for, the entire package of software
and that any value to be ascribed to Internet Explorer is built into this single price." Id. (citations omitted).
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those product bundles that raise the cost or difficulty of doing business for
would-be competitors to prohibitively high levels, thereby depriving
consumers of the opportunity to evaluate a competing product on its relative
merits."313
Judge Jackson found that Windows 98 and Internet Explorer were
separate products because, under Jefferson Parish's "character of demand"
analysis, Web browsers and operating systems are "distinguishable in the
eyes of buyers."314 He elaborated:
Consumers often base their choice of which browser should reside on their
operating system on their individual demand for the specific functionalities or
characteristics of a particular browser, separate and apart from the
functionalities afforded by the operating system itself. Moreover, the
behavior of other, lesser software vendors confirms that it is certainly
efficient to provide an operating system and a browser separately, or at least
in separable form. Microsoft is the only firm to refuse to license its operating
system without a browser.315
Judge Jackson concluded that "Microsoft's decision to offer only the
bundled-'integrated'-version of Windows and Internet Explorer derived
not from technical necessity or business efficiencies; rather, it was the result
of a deliberate and purposeful choice to quell incipient competition before it
reached truly minatory proportions."316
Judge Jackson acknowledged the D.C. Circuit's "admonition . . . in
Microsoft II of the perils associated with a rigid application of the traditional
'separate products' test to computer software design."317 Yet, in the next
several sentences of his opinion, Judge Jackson turned that admonition into a
denunciation of the D.C. Circuit's approach in Microsoft I:
Given the virtually infinite malleability of software code, software upgrades
and new application features, such as Web browsers, could virtually always
be configured so as to be capable of separate and subsequent installation by
an immediate licensee or end user. A court mechanically applying a strict
"separate demand" test could improvidently wind up condemning
"integrations" that represent genuine improvements to software that are
benign from the standpoint of consumer welfare and a competitive market.
Clearly, this is not a desirable outcome. Similar concerns have motivated
313 Id.
314 Id. (citations omitted).
315 Id. at 50-51 (citations omitted).
316 Id. at 51.
317 Id.
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other courts, as well as the D.C. Circuit, to resist a strict application of the
"separate products" tests to similar questions of "technological tying." 318
Judge Jackson stated that he was "confident that [his] conclusion, limited by
the unique circumstances of this case, [was] consistent with the Supreme
Court's teaching to date," and he emphasized that he was "not at liberty to
extrapolate a new rule governing the tying of software products."319
Judge Jackson reinforced his conclusion by citing approvingly, though
as dictum, the theory of partial substitutes contained in Professor Lessig's
amicus brief and emphasizing that "the true source of the threat posed to the
competitive process by Microsoft's bundling decisions stems from the fact
that a competitor to the tied product bore the potential, but had not yet
matured sufficiently, to open up the tying product market to competition."320
Judge Jackson implied that software integration was special in this respect,
but in a way that justified greater judicial intervention, not less.321 Quoting
the 1996 and 1999 supplements to the Areeda treatise, Judge Jackson
reasoned that "[a] company able to leverage its substantial power in the tying
product market in order to force consumers to accept a tie of partial
substitutes is thus able to spread inefficiency from one market to the next...
[and] thereby 'sabotage a nascent technology that might compete with the
tying product but for its foreclosure from the market.'322
E. The Deficiency of Judge Jackson's Rule
Judge Jackson's product integration rule is deficient for the reasons that
motivated my approach in Part IV and the D.C. Circuit's product integration
rule in Microsoft II. Judge Jackson's rule also fails to capture the subtlety
even of Professor Lessig's rule, which itself is incomplete for the reasons
that I explained in Part VII.
I do not speculate on what, in the event that Judge Jackson's decision
were reversed and remanded on the product integration question, a court
would subsequently conclude on the basis of the factual record that was
compiled in the Microsoft trial. Nonetheless, it is possible to conclude that
Judge Jackson's product integration rule is flawed on legal and economic
318 Id. (citing Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 542-43 (9th Cir.
1983); Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1330 (5th Cir. 1976); Telex
Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 347 (N.D. Okla. 1973)).
319 Id.
320 Id. at 51 n.6 (citing 10 AREEDA, ELHAUGE & HOVENKAMP, supra note 113, 1747).
321 Id. ("Under these conditions, the anticompetitive harm from a software bundle is much more
substantial and pernicious than the typical tie.").
322 Id. at 51 n.6 (quoting 10 AREEDA, ELHAUGE & HOVENKAMP, supra note 113, 1747;
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP 1999 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 114,1 1746.1d).
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grounds, and that the judge failed to ensure that the record in the Microsoft
case contained all of the economic evidence that would be necessary for the
court to make an informed conclusion of law under a product integration rule
that was properly tailored to the technological dynamism of the software
industry. It is disconcerting in this regard to read, in a Washington Post
interview given the day that Judge Jackson issued his final judgment
ordering the divestiture of Microsoft, that the judge considered himself
unable to evaluate the legal significance of the economic evidence adduced
at trial: "It's important you understand what my function is here .... I am
not an economist. I do not have the resources of economic research or any
significant ability to be able to craft a remedy of my own devising."323
Much of Judge Jackson's decision on tying, particularly his reference to
Professor Lessig's theory of partial substitutes, suggests that the judge was
doing something more than a straightforward application of Eastman Kodak
and Jefferson Parish. He seemed to consider several but not all of the four
additional questions that I propose in Part IV for analyzing the lawfulness of
product integration in technologically dynamic markets.
First, Judge Jackson clearly regarded software for personal computers to
be a technologically dynamic market, a fact that caused him to comment in
dictum about Professor Lessig's theory of preservation of monopoly over the
tying product by virtue of partial substitutes. Thus, Judge Jackson could be
said to have answered affirmatively the first question of my proposed rule.
With respect to the second question of my proposed rule, Judge Jackson
did not address whether it is plausible that consumers will benefit from
subadditive costs or superadditive demand resulting from product
integration. His discussion of the scope and extent of consumer-welfare
benefits from Microsoft's integration of Windows and Internet Explorer was
grudging and incomplete. 324 Because his finding of fact contained no
citations to the evidence introduced at trial on this subject (or for that matter,
on any other subject), it is unclear how the judge reached his conclusion that
only negligible consumer benefits flowed from Microsoft's product
integration; it is also unclear why contradictory evidence of consumer
benefits introduced at trial did not warrant the judge's comment. Given his
exiguous discussion of the consumer benefits of Microsoft's software
integration, Judge Jackson certainly did not present his discussion within the
formal economic structure of subadditive costs and superadditive demand.
323 James V. Grimaldi, Reluctant Ruling for Judge: Jackson Says He Would Still Prefer Out-of-
Court Settlement, WASH. POST, June 8, 2000, at AI (quoting Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson).
324 Microsoft Findings of Law, supra note 5, 186, 193; see also Lessig Amicus Brief, supra
note 4, at 16.
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Judge Jackson did not address in detail the topic of the third question in
my proposed test. Clearly, he regarded it as probable that Microsoft's
product integration would preserve a monopoly over the tying product by
substantially reducing competition from the tied product. That much can be
inferred from Judge Jackson's citation to Professor Lessig's theory of partial
substitutes. But an enthusiastic citation to a scholar's theory (which itself is
subject to the multiple ambiguities detailed above in Part VII) is not
tantamount to a rigorous analysis of the economic facts necessary to apply
that theory in practice.
Fourth, and finally, Judge Jackson never undertook a Williamsonian
analysis of the countervailing consumer-welfare benefits and harms of
product integration. To do so would have required, first, that the judge take
seriously the possibility that consumer benefits of some nontrivial magnitude
flow from Microsoft's software integration and, second, that he receive and
evaluate the economic facts that would permit quantification of that tradeoff.
Judge Jackson did neither.
Conclusion
The landmark Microsoft case presents the question of how antitrust
doctrine on tying arrangements will treat the integration of software
products. Given the importance of this question to the development of the
New Economy, the Supreme Court will need to address this question and, in
so doing, clarify the applicability, if any, of Eastman Kodak and Jefferson
Parish as a product integration rule for software.
In anticipation of the Court's revisiting of the law of tying
arrangements, I have proposed in this Article an antitrust rule for judging the
lawfulness of software integration under § I of the Sherman Act. My rule
adds four questions to the elements that are currently contained in tying
doctrine after Eastman Kodak and Jefferson Parish:
1. Is the market technologically mature or technologically
dynamic?
2. Is it plausible that consumers will benefit from subadditive
costs or superadditive demand resulting from product integration?
3. Is it probable that integration will preserve a monopoly over
the tying product by substantially reducing competition from the tied
product?
4. Will the reduction, if any, in competition cause consumer
welfare losses that exceed the consumer welfare gains from subadditive
costs or superadditive demand?
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The purpose of these additional elements for liability is to produce an
antitrust rule that recognizes that the consumer-welfare effects of product
integration in technologically mature markets differ markedly from those in
technologically dynamic markets. As long as the law of tying arrangements
fails to make that distinction, it is as likely to harm consumer welfare in the
New Economy as to enhance it.

